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CONTAINING HEALTH CARE
COSTS: ETHICAL AND
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF
CHANGES IN THE
METHODS OF PAYING
PHYSICIANS
Alexander M. Capron *
Economic pressures are constantly changing the delivery of and access to health
care in America. In examining changes in physician payment mechanisms and ef-
fects of business-orientation organization of the health care system, and in evaluating
those effects along the ethical dimensions of fidelity, fairness, and access, Professor
Capron concludes that the changes and effects must bejustified ethically, not simply
as the results of marketplace forces.
INTRODUCTION
ARE THE MEDICAL profession's ethical precepts about fairness
and fidelity to patients adequate to meet the challenges facing
health care today? Signs of change abound in the American health
care system. Although these changes are certain to have profound
effects on the ways in which people receive health care and on their
relations with physicians, patients and physicians have not been the
moving force behind the changes. Rather, the changes are largely
being driven by the financial concerns of the "third parties" who
pay most health care bills-the government and employers. Those
who witnessed the initiation of third-party payment more than a
half-century ago could have predicted the inevitability of changes in
health care.' However, the extent and nature of those changes
* Topping Professor of Law, Medicine and Public Policy, University of Southern Cali-
fornia. B.A., Swarthmore College (1966); LL.B., Yale (1969). The author gratefully ac-
knowledges the research assistance of Pat Chock, University of Southern California Law
Center Class of 1987, and the comments of the Office of Technology staff and its outside
reviewers on OTA Report No. 533-4330.0 (1985). This Article draws on that report which
was prepared as background for the OTA project on Medicare payment for physician
services.
1. P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 299-310
(1982) (describing organized medicine's resistance to health insurance because of the poten-
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probably would have surprised anyone in the 1920's and 1930's, so
remarkably has health care been transformed in the intervening de-
cades. There is no question that certain changes in the health care
system were necessary; some changes may even be provoked by the
current alterations in the financing of care and the resulting increase
in competition among providers. Other needed changes are un-
likely to occur as a result of the financing alterations, while some of
the likely changes are ethically worrisome. With foresight and de-
termination it should be possible to avoid undesirable consequences
and achieve better results along such dimensions as the fairness of
the system, patients' access to care, and physicians' fidelity to pa-
tients' interests, including the receipt of quality health care.
Hospitals and similar institutions have experienced most of the
recent changes in health care financing. Representative of this
change is the prospective payment system (PPS) which determines
the fee paid for the care of a hospitalized Medicare patient accord-
ing to the Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG) into which the patient
falls rather than by the charges incurred in caring for the particular
patient. Even though addressed to institutions, the changes in pay-
ments for hospitalized patients instituted both by the government
and by private firms have forced physicians to adjust the way they
practice.
Public and private payors' cost-containment efforts have already
changed the means by which physicians are paid for outpatient
services. These changes will continue in the future. For example,
strong pressures are building to adopt one or more alternative pay-
ment mechanisms in place of the Customary-Prevailing-Reasonable
(CPR) fee-for-service program now used to pay physicians for treat-
ing Medicare patients. Likewise, physicians are now competing
with one another-in a manner that has not been seen since the
early years of this century. At stake are contracts with employers
and health insurance companies to care for large blocks of patients
on a prepaid or reduced-fee basis. Further, competitive business
pressures are leading increased numbers of physicians to seek em-
ployment with hospitals and other health care organizations rather
than entering the traditional professional medical practice.
American health care is increasingly shaped by market focus
driven by the changes in payment mechanisms and other factors
tial for insurers to place themselves between patients and physicians). See, e.g., Minutes of
the Eighty-Fifth Annual Session of the American Medical Association, 102 J. A.M.A. 2191,
2201 (1934) (recommending that there be "no restrictions on treatment or prescribing not
formulated and enforced by the organized medical profession").
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such as the growth in large multi-institution health care providers,
especially investor-owned facilities. The efforts by third-party
payors to contain costs by changing the means through which phy-
sicians are paid significantly adds to this alteration. These simulta-
neous and closely interrelated developments are the topic of this
Artice. The growing perception of medicine as a business has en-
couraged the public (especially governmental and corporate officials
with financial responsibilities for health care) to be more skeptical
about exempting medical professionals from economic regulation.
At the same time, the growth of market-oriented providers has of-
fered those who wish to reduce the cost of medicine an opportunity
to use "the discipline of the market" in familiar ways.
This Article will describe and classify changes in physician-pay-
ment mechanisms and then analyze the changes and some of their
likely effects, in light of the existing legal and institutional mecha-
nisms.2 The Article next sketches some potential effects of the med-
ical profession's business orientation on the organization of the
American health care system.'
Finally, the effects are evaluated along several ethical dimen-
sions, described as fidelity, fairness, and access. The fidelity dimen-
sion focuses on the physician-patient relationship; in the
Hippocratic tradition, the actions of medical practitioners are sup-
posed to promote the interests of patients above all others, including
the physician. The fairness and access dimensions arise at the socie-
tal level. Due to the ethical importance of health care, a just society
will endeavor to develop an equitable system for the distribution of
health care that treats providers fairly, that ensures everyone access
to an adequate level of care, and that prevents anyone bearing ex-
cessive burdens in the process.
I. CHANGES IN PHYSICIAN PAYMENT
The system of third-party payment on a retrospective fee-for-
service basis is dominated by incentives for excessive intervention
with overpriced procedures. Indeed, it is unlikely that any other
2. See infra notes 4-73 and accompanying text. In evaluating the changes-both those
already occurring and those likely to result from some of the proposed means of paying
physicians-their interactive nature, and sometimes ironic effects, must be borne in mind.
For example, changes that restrict a physician's income from fees, which might seem to
deemphasize the financial side of practice, could actually increase financial pressures on the
practice and thereby accelerate the tendency to treat medicine as a business. Practitioners
may feel compelled to make up for lower fees and tighter controls by organizing their prac-
tices so as to find new means of generating income.
3. See infra notes 74-92 and accompanying text.
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system of paying health care providers could offer greater incentives
for excessive interventions with overpriced procedures than that
which has dominated third-party payment, both private and federal,
for the past twenty years. Proposals for reforming those incentives
arose virtually as soon as the present insurance system was created.
When implemented, as in prepaid health maintenance organizations
(HMOs), reforms were usually justified by improving the quality
and the appropriateness of services delivered to patients. Yet, the
vested interests of insurance companies, physicians, and hospitals,
and the basic satisfaction of most patients kept extensive reforms at
bay. However, the current season of health care cost awareness has
revived the movement towards health care payment reform.
This Article will describe those changes being considered that
bear directly on physician payments. Not considered are those
changes that alter physicians' incentives indirectly, by changing the
way hospitals are paid4 or the degree to which patients are required
to pay a portion of their bills.'
A. Current Predominant Methods of Payment
1. Insurance in the Fee-for-Service Context
a. Payment and Compensation. The United States is unusual
among developed nations today in that the dominant method by
which consumers pay for health services and by which physicians
are compensated is the fee-for-service method. Most of the reforms
generated by the governmental and private sectors in their roles as
insurers are aimed at altering the payment method, while reforms
aimed at changing the compensation method are impelled by mar-
4. See Capron & Gray, Between You and Your Doctor, Wall St. J., Feb. 6, 1984, at 24,
col. 3.
5. The failure of this Article to address changes in enrollee co-payment and deductible
formats is not because they are insignificant in terms of either extent or impact. Indeed, such
changes have occurred in both private and public programs: the number of employers who
have added deductibles to their health benefits in the past several years has multiplied ten-
fold. Increasing the cost to beneficiaries has been, and will continue to be, a major avenue for
federal cost and expenditure containment. Cost increases can cause enrollees to make use of
fewer services, even to the point of adverse health impacts among the most vulnerable popu-
lations. Furthermore, making patients more aware of the costs of care will contribute to the
general increase of market-sensitivity in health care, which will, in turn, affect physicians'
behavior and their relationship with patients.
Despite such effects, including the general effect on the income of physicians and on the
success of the overall cost-containment efforts, changes in coinsurance and deductibles are
not evaluated in this Article. Instead, this Article addresses only direct alterations in the
methods used by third parties to pay for physicians' services.
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ket forces and regulatory changes which result in structural altera-
tions in the health system.
Although changes in methods of compensation are the primary
subject of this section, it is important to remember that changes in
the method of payment may not translate directly into changes in
incentives to physicians because of different compensation methods.
[A]pproximately half the active physicians, excluding residents,
were compensated by fee-for-service. This figure includes all solo
practitioners, seven percent of physicians in group practice, and
sixty percent of hospital-based physicians. Just under twenty
percent were salaried. The remainder of U.S. physicians-
roughly thirty percent-received a mixed form of compensation,
with a fixed component analogous to salary and an incentive
component analogous to fee-for-service. 6
Thus, although a physician's total income is not directly corre-
lated with the type of compensation, but varies with specialty, years
in practice, geographic location, and hours worked,7 it is a rare phy-
sician whose income is unaffected by the quantity of service he or
she provides. This may be true even for salaried physicians, de-
pending on their relationship to the institution in which they work.
b. The Dominant Third-Party Mode. The present fee-for-ser-
vice mode of payment originated at a time when patients paid phy-
sicians directly for services provided. Today, however, two-thirds
of payments to physicians ultimately come from either public or
private insurance.' Because of the profession's resistance to direct
relationships between insurance companies and physicians, most
payment plans developed in the indemnity format. Under this for-
mat, physicians bill patients directly for services provided and the
patients are subsequently reimbursed by their insurance carrier,
sometimes for the full amount they paid or for only a lesser "al-
lowed" amount. Over time, however, many insurance programs
adopted the service approach to insurance, in which enrollees' pre-
miums guarantee them certain services such as a specified number
of days of hospital care, and those providing the services agree to
accept the program's allowed payment as full compensation.9
6. Yoder, Physicians Payment Methods: Forms and Levels of Physicians Compensation,
in INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, REFORMING PHYSICIAN PAYMENT: REPORT OF A CONFER-
ENCE 87, 88 (1984) (based on published data for 1980).
7. Id. at 95-96.
8. Gibson, Waldo & Levit, National Health Expenditures, 1982, 5 HEALTH CARE FIN.
REV., Fall 1983, at I (third parties, comprised of private health insurers, governments, pri-
vate charities, and industry, financed 68% of the $287 billion in personal health care in
1982).
9. In Medicare parlance, physicians can either bill patients directly or "accept assign-
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Insurers determine their allowance using a "fee screen," under
which they pay the lower of a physician's actual charge or a reason-
able charge calculated according to one of several formulae.1" In
Medicare programs, the formula is called CPR because a physi-
cian's own customary charge and the area's prevailing charge1 are
used to calculate the figure that will be compared to the actual
charge in deciding what is reasonable."2
ment," meaning that they agree to bill the program and accept its determination of the rea-
sonable charge (less 20% for patients' co-insurance) as full payment. OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY AND COSTS OF THE MEDICARE PRO-
GRAM (July 1984). Under either payment method, the enrollee is liable for an annual deduct-
ible of $75. Id Although assignment is mandatory for Medicaid beneficiaries, physicians
had until recently been free to decide whether to accept assignment on a bill-by-bill basis for
most Medicare patients; in 1982 only about one-third accepted assignment in all Medicare
cases, and voluntary assignment averaged only about 40% of Medicare claims. Id. Through
the Deficit Reduction Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-96 (Supp. 1984), and the Medicare and Medi-
caid Budget Reconciliation Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1061 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 5, 26, 29, 42 and 45 U.S.C.), Congress tried to increase
the number of physicians who would accept assignment in all cases by offering inducements
to those physicians who would accept assignment for all services to Medicare patients
(termed Medicare Participating Physicians or MPP), while still permitting "non-par" physi-
cians to decide on the payment method on a bill-by-bill basis. The incentives to become a
MPP include Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) compiling and distributing
MPP directories to. senior groups, to social security offices, and (at a charge) to the public;
establishing toll-free information lines for MPPs and beneficiaries; publicizing the MPP pro-
gram; providing MPP emblems. 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(i)(1-4). The incentive of exemption from
the current price freeze on physician services was also offered to participating physicians,
HCFA MEDICARE AND MEDICAID GUIDE, INSTRUCTION (1984), although continuing Fed-
eral budgetary problems may render this incentive illusory. Were such a plan to be imple-
mented, MPPs would be allowed to submit bills for higher amounts to update their
customary charges, although the actual fee received would be based on the frozen CPR level.
Perhaps because of physician skepticism about the value of the incentives that actually
would be provided, the new system did not raise participation rates significantly, but it did
increase the rate of claims assigned. In the first year (Fiscal Year 1985, beginning Oct. 1,
1984), 30.4% of practitioners signed participation agreements with Medicare; in the second
year, the rate fell to 28.4%. The rate of claims assigned stood at 68.2% in December of
1985, which is a decline from the initial spurt early in the new program (increased from the
level of 59.6% for voluntary and involuntary assignments in 1984). Mcllrath, Medicare Par-
ticipation Rates Decline, Am. Med. News, Feb. 28, 1986, at 1., col. 1.
10. In certain circumstances, the actual charge will be deemed the reasonable charge
even though it exceeds the customary or prevailing charges, provided that the reasonable
charge may not be higher than the charge for comparable services provided to a carrier's non-
Medicare subscribers. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v) (1982).
11. In addition to using a state or contiguous region within a state as the "locality" for
collecting data to calculate the area's prevailing charge, insurance carriers may configure the
charge area in other ways, such as separately grouping noncontiguous urban and rural locali-
ties that have similar charging patterns. The HCFA now recognizes 240 geographic charge
localities. U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH CARE FINANCING AD-
MINISTRATION, MEDICARE CARRIER MANUAL (1984).
12. In Blue Shield and comparable plans, the fee screen formula is called UCR, in which
the first screening level is the physician's usual (rather than customary) fee, and the second
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Although the prevailing Medicare charge has been limited by
statute since 1971 to the seventy-fifth percentile,1 3 physicians can
obviously inflate the CPR rate for a procedure, simply by raising
the amount they charge for it. This not only will increase their ac-
tual charge to the particular patient and their own customary
charge for all patients but will also inflate the prevailing charge for
the locality. Moreover, the usual market restraints on sellers' abil-
ity to increase their prices do not operate very effectively for medi-
cal prices because patients usually lack comparative information
about physicians' charges and have only a small incentive to select
physicians based on the prices they charge.14
To limit this inflationary pressure on the Medicare program,
Congress included provisions in the Social Security Amendments of
1972 under which the annual increases in prevailing charges since
1976 have been capped by a Medicare Economic Index (MEI) based
on increases in general earnings levels and increases in physicians'
practice costs.15 Nonetheless, Medicare Part B expenditures (three-
quarters of which go for physician services) increased at an annual
twenty percent rate from 1980 to 1983.16 Beyond the inflation in
unit prices that typically occurs in a CPR system, expenditures are
also inflated because physicians lack incentive to provide the most
economical or efficient treatment, rather, the incentive with insured
patients is to base the particular treatment-selection option on the
relative rate of reimbursement among the medically acceptable al-
level is typically set at the 80th to 90th percentile of the customary (rather than prevailing)
charge for the same service in the local area. See generally Yett, Der, Ernst & Hay, Physician
Pricing and Health Insurance Reimbursement, 5 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Winter 1983, at
69, 70-71; Showstack, Blumberg, Schwartz & Schroeder, Fee-for-Service Physician Payment:
Analysis of Current Methods and Their Development, 16 INQUIRY 230, 234-35 (1979).
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(L) (1982). The 75th percentile means the lowest charge
for the service that was greater than or equal to 75% of the customary charges submitted by
physicians in the locality in the previous calendar year.
14. This insensitivity to comparative prices among insured patients does not mean that
the demand for medical service is totally price-inelastic, as recent studies of the role of patient
co-payments and deductibles have shown.
15. The prevailing rate is either the lesser of the unadjusted prevailing charge or the
MEI-adjusted rate, which is derived by multiplying the charge for the service that prevailed
in the 1973 fee screen by the current MEL.
16. "[M]edicare's rate of increase has been significantly greater than national average
trends-and the difference has been widening." SENATE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING,
MEDICARE: PAYING THE PHYSICIAN- HISTORY, ISSUES AND OPTIONS 4 (Comm. Print
1984). The 20.9% rate for Medicare in 1980-82 was six points higher than the 14.9% rate for
physician services generally during that period. But the existence of any large increase (14.9
or 20.9%) in the face of the recession that gripped the rest of the American economy at that
time is itself remarkable testimony to the inflationary tendencies built into third-party fee-for-
service payments.
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ternatives. Although insurance carriers increasingly have made vig-
orous attempts to identify inappropriate interventions for which
they will not pay, the wide variations in acceptable practice restrict
the effectiveness of such review processes.1 7 In any event, such ef-
forts are much more effective in removing a particular treatment for
a condition from the reimbursable category than in eliminating pay-
ment in a particular case on the ground that the physician could
have achieved equal results less expensively using another approved
treatment method. Despite third parties' greater power in today's
environment, an insurer who routinely second-guessed physicians in
this manner would meet considerable market resistance.
A CPR-type system, in addition to its potential for disserving
patients (such as the detriment to quality of care that can occur
through overuse of a medical procedure), may create other ethical
problems for the medical profession itself. First, the amount paid
for the same procedure varies, not only between localities, but also
among specialists within the same locality, creating inequities
among physicians. Second, CPRs emphasize procedures; thus, the
financial rewards to practitioners in procedural fields such as pa-
thology, anesthesiology, surgery, and obstetrics are much greater
than those in the so-called "cognitive services" such as internal
medicine, psychiatry, general practice, and pediatrics.18 Yet, as
suggested above, it was the financial concerns of payors and not the
ethical needs of enrollees that have led to the current proposals to
replace the CPR fee-for-service system. We turn now to consider
several strategies for containing the costs of physicians' services.
B. Cost-reduction Proposal Objectives
1. Limiting Unit Prices for Medical Services
The primary motivation for seeking new methods of paying phy-
sicians is to gain control over expenditures both by achieving pre-
dictability and by restraining the rise in total health care spending.
Consequently, all proposals share the common characteristic of an
expected reduction in the amount a physician would otherwise re-
ceive for the average patient's care. It is important to distinguish
17. See, eg., Wennberg, Dealing with Medical Practice Variations: A Proposal for Ac-
tion, 3 HEALTH AFF., Summer 1984, at 6; Wennberg & Gittlesohn, SmallArea Variations in
Health Care Delivery, 182 Sci. 1102 (1973).
18. See, eg., AMA, 2 SMS REPORT No. 4 (July 1983) (estimating physician's 1982
average net practice income as follows: radiologists, $137,000; anesthesiologists, $131,400;
surgeons, $130,500; obstetrician/gynecologists, $115,000; internists, $86,8000; psychiatrists,
$76,500; general practitioners, $71,900; and pediatricians, $70,300).
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those restraints on expenditures that reduce the price of individual
units of care (i.e., examinations, diagnostic tests, surgical opera-
tions, etc.) from those that attempt to reduce the number of units
employed.
A physician's treatment charges reflect several factors: princi-
pally, return on investment in equipment and other property, profit
for efficiently managing workers in the physician's employ, and re-
warding his or her own work, including investment in education
and specialized training. The present CPR fee-for-service system
gives physicians a great deal of leeway, collectively and individu-
ally, to set the prices on these items because the market does not
operate very effectively in this area. Two possible methods to re-
duce the excess profits that providers can now extract are regulation
(e.g., the proposals discussed below for modifying the fee-for-service
system and for a fee schedule) or "bidding" and other price-compet-
itive behaviors designed to create more of a market. Successful re-
forms would result in physicians receiving a reasonable reward as
entrepreneurs (e.g., a reasonable return on investments in equip-
ment and property, payments as employers of nurses and assistants,
and reward for the risks of running a business), as well as payment
for their own labor commensurate with other professionally edu-
cated people in the marketplace. The monopoly profit, however,
would be removed from the service unit price.
a. Refinement of Current Payment Methods. The least radical
changes in third-party reimbursement involve modifying the calcu-
lation of the fee paid. For example, the current payment system
could be changed by establishing a uniform fee for a particular pro-
cedure. The fee could be standardized based upon the physician's
specialty, the service site, the type of visit, the locality, or the re-
gion. Standardization would eliminate the inequity of payment for
the same service in the same area by removing the "customary"
factor from the equation.
Reimbursement could also be changed by altering assignment
procedures. The option to reject assignment has been viewed as a
license to overcharge.19 If Medicare made assignment mandatory,
patients would be protected from these charges. However,
mandatory assignment could result in several problems. Histori-
cally, a substantial number of non-"participating physicians" none-
theless accept assignment as full payment for treating some of their
19. Conversely, some physicians view the option to reject assignment as necessary to
avoid being locked into a payment structure that underpays them for some procedures.
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patients. If these physicians refuse to participate under a
mandatory assignment program, they would become unavailable to
patients who rely on Medicare payments for physicians' care. Thus,
there might be a decrease in physician participation in the Medicare
program and/or reduction in both access and quality of care; the
result would be equal access only to participating physicians rather
than equal access to all physicians with "reasonable charges."2
Another option would be to increase Medicare's percentage pay-
ment on assigned claims, thereby guaranteeing a higher proportion
of the fee to the physician. One way to fund the increased payment
would be to discount payment on non-assigned claims.2" A desir-
able side effect of this option would be to create an incentive for
patients to seek care from physicians who accept assignment be-
cause the required co-payment would be lowered and uncovered
costs would be avoided.
Periodic reassessment of the fees charged for procedures would
also produce a change in payment.22 Typically, a new technology is
introduced at a high price due to the specialized knowledge pos-
sessed by its developers and the limited supply of equipment avail-
able to implement it. As the procedures become routine the costs
decline. The current system does not routinely monitor declines or
adjust the prices downward.
Limiting physicians' fees charged for services provided outside
of their practice would further change Medicare payment. Instead
of allowing the physician to determine these charges independently,
a set handling charge could be established by Congress, as has been
done for laboratory tests.23
Payment could also be changed by modifying the fee limit calcu-
lation in either of two ways. First, the rate at which physicians are
paid could be changed by lowering the percentile of the allowable
20. Jencks & Dobson, Strategies for Reforming Medicare's Physician Payments: Physi-
cian Diagnosis-Related Groups and Other Approaches, 312 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1492, 1497
(1985).
21. Hadley, How Should Medicare Pay Physicians?, 62 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q.
279, 295 (1984):
To finance the reduction in cost-sharing for beneficiaries treated on assignment,
Medicare could discount its payment for nonassigned claims. This would further
increase the difference in beneficiary cost-sharing between assigned and nonassigned
claims. Percentage reductions could be set so that the impact on taxpayers is neu-
tral, with users of nonassigned services subsidizing reduced cost-sharing for users of
assigned services.
22. Id. at 295.
23. Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1061 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. 1395 (1982)).
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charge. Second, the economic index calculation for annual in-
creases could be changed.
Payment could also be controlled by routing all services through
a primary-care physician. The growing number of people who cir-
cumvent the primary-care physician and deal directly with the spe-
cialists has increased the cost of care in two ways.2 4 First, the
provision of specialty services itself generates higher bills. Second,
the specialist lacks incentives to provide cost-effective care.25 Re-
quiring the primary-care physician to screen patients not only
reduces the cost of unnecessary service, but provides the opportu-
nity for alternative, less expensive treatement forms such as patient
education and non-surgical interventions.
b. Explicit Fee Schedules. Fee schedules are widely used in pri-
vate health plans' basic medical expense policies, under which sub-
scribers are paid the lesser of the physician's actual fee or the
scheduled amount for the service, without regard to medical spe-
cialty or geographic location.z6 It has been noted that HCFA could
likewise construct an explicit fee schedule for Medicare benefi-
ciaries, as a means of controlling prices and eliminating the CPR
system variations.27
Fee schedules differ from current reimbursement method refine-
ments because they are based on independent value assessments of a
medical intervention rather than on mere variations in the existing
pattern of charges. This could eliminate the wide range of charges
for the same service in the same area (such as specialist versus
generalist, and urban versus rural) depending upon how the fee
schedule was implemented. The adoption of a national fee schedule
would eliminate regional variation. The most rigorous type of fee
24. See E. FRIEDSON, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF
APPLIED KNOWLEDGE 93 (1970).
25. See id. at 306-07. The specialist is primarily colleague dependent. Consequently, he
or she does not have to compete in the patient market for clients and is less concerned with
controlling costs. The primary care physician is primarily patient-dependent. As a result, if
there is sufficient competition for clients, the primary-care physician may be more cost-con-
scious.
Specialists appear to be providing an increasing amount of primary care to patients. Ad-
ditionally, the percentage of self-referrals by patients to specialists ranges from a low of
11.4% for neurosurgery to a high of 87.2% for pediatrics. ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUN-
DATION, MEDICAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 26 (1981).
26. See Showstack, Blumber, Schwartz & Schroeder, supra note 12, at 233, 236 (discuss-
ing "maximum benefit" schedules).
27. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, PAYMENT FOR PHYSICIAN SERVICES:
STRATEGIES FOR MEDICARE 20 (1986) [hereinafter cited as PAYMENT FOR PHYSICIAN
SERVICES]. A fee schedule would also remedy one problem for patients, the unpredictability
of the actual out-of-pocket cost of a physician's services.
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schedule would require a "relative-value scale" to be developed for
all reimbursable medical procedures, based on: (a) all resource
costs; (b) charges; (c) physician time; and/or (d) consensus.28 The
degree of difficulty of the procedure could also be incorporated;
however, this would increase the incentive to perform "difficult"
procedures, resulting in increased costs. Consensus could be deter-
mined through the use of medical experts or through competitive
pricing, with the aim of finding the minimum prices at which physi-
cians are willing to provide services. Although this would prevent
access barriers, it would tend to maintain the current distribution of
physicians and specialists.
All of these measures are actually based on input-costs compari-
son and might better be described as "relative-cost scales." The
construction of an actual relative-value scale would require bases
for measuring the outcome value of various medical services for pa-
tients-clearly a formidable task. The most likely process would
involve the creation of an expert consensus, akin to the Consensus
Development Conferences sponsored by the National Institute of
Health since 1975.29 A process involving only experts' views, how-
ever, would not necessarily reflect the true social consensus of in-
formed consumers on the relative value of various outcomes.30 The
creation of relative values would be further complicated if separate
values for particular procedures were calculated for different dis-
eases and conditions. For example, the relative value of a CAT
scan might differ when used for head injuries rather than for recur-
rent headaches because the likelihood of improving patient outcome
differs.
The monetary conversion factor, which converts the relative
values into fees, is critical.31 The exact multiplier is a political de-
termination, but it must be set with care. If budgetary concerns
(i.e., attempts to hold down total Medicare spending) lead to too
low a number, physicians may either refuse to treat Medicare pa-
tients or reduce the quality of care. If it is too high, Medicare will
28. See Jencks & Dobson, supra note 20, at 1494-95. "All resource costs" could include
physician services, overhead, training expenses, etc. "Charges" could be based on prevailing
area costs or could be standardized across the country. "Physician time" could be based on
the time-cost of producing the service.
29. Mullan & Jacoby, The Town Meeting for Technology: The Maturation of Consensus
Conferences, 254 J. A.M.A. 1068 (1985).
30. Pauly, What is Unnecessary Surgery?, 57 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND. Q. 95, 98-99
(1979).
31. As with refinements in current payment mechanisms, yearly increases could be lim-
ited by an economic index to prevent excess inflation of rates.
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increase reimbursement, resulting in excess delivery of less needed
services (along with a corresponding increase in physician
income).32
The relative-value scale system could be further strengthened by
incorporating a utilization review process. In order to control costs,
the use of services could be systematically reviewed. Information
feed-back could be used to make appropriate adjustments in the rel-
ative value scale and the monetary conversion factor. Thus, fee
schedules are more likely to control costs than to ensure that a par-
ticular level of use is targeted toward the most appropriate patients.
Fee schedules do not, by themselves, control the rate usage.
One means to control this factor is to incorporate an expenditure
cap under which a total sum of money would be allocated for each
service, using the relative-value scale as a guide. Physicians would
then bill for services according to a fee schedule, but payment
would be discontinued as the charges approached the cap.33 Alter-
native controls on the rate at which services are provided include:
(a) allowing a full fee for the most expensive service provided and a
discounted fee (or no fee) for additional services performed at the
same time; (b) decreasing fees over time for follow-up visits;
(c) paying fees only in packages; (d) paying full fees for a service
until it has been performed a certain number of times, and then
discounting payment for subsequent performance.34
c. Bargained Prices. The technical difficulties in establishing fee
schedules have led to bargaining as a more feasible means of reduc-
ing the prices of physicians' services. In most situations, health care
consumers do not participate in a real "market" for the services
they receive; hence, there is little opportunity for them to bargain
over prices. Rather than simply play a passive role as payors of the
charges incurred by consumers, some major payors (such as insur-
ance carriers, unions, and employers) have entered directly into fee
negotiations with physicians. Preferred provider organizations
(PPOs) are a major example of this development. PPOs are agree-
ments between a payor and a group of physicians (and other health
32. See Hadley, supra note 21, at 291-92.
33. See W. GLASER, HEALTH INSURANCE BARGAINING: FOREIGN LESSONS FOR
AMERICANS (1978). Though this would eliminate incentives for over-treatment, it could
cause access problems as physicians who have met their service cap refuse to treat patients
who need the service.
34. See W. GLASER, PAYING THE DOCTOR: SYSTEMS OF REMUNERATION AND
THEIR EFFECTS 145-150 (1970). Such schedules could also create problems of quality of care
and access to services if certain procedures are discouraged due to low fees, or if physicians
feel that the amount of time needed for the service is disproportionate to the remuneration.
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care professions) to provide medical services to a specific patient
group based upon negotiated (and generally discounted) fees.
PPOs are primarily sponsored by hospitals and physician groups.
Independent entrepreneurs and service purchasers such as insur-
ance companies, union and employee groups, and employers also
sponsor PPOs. 36 Providers' incentives to join include access to a
pool of patients and more rapid payment of bills. Reduced rates are
negotiated based on insurance companies' considerable economic
clout. If Medicare were placed on a PPO footing, many of the in-
centives currently being utilized in the MPP program could be in-
cluded to enhance the desirability of physicians' participation.
Although services are provided at a discounted rate, thereby
lowering the cost of individual treatment procedures, most PPOs
provide no incentives to contain the number of services provided.37
Like other fee-for-service systems, a PPO provider's income rises
with increased volume of services; thus, the payor bears the major
risk. PPOs are also vulnerable to antitrust law violation charges38
and may be precluded by state laws.39
2. Limiting the Amount and Type of Services Used
The payment methods discussed above offer hope of restricting
the price of physicians' services, but, to varying degrees, they all
share a cost-containment strategy weakness. They shift physicians'
incentives from increasing the charge per treatment unit to increas-
35. Present PPOs provide patients such incentives as lower co-payments or deductibles
to use participating providers, but still allow patients to choose other providers.
36. See Gabel & Ermann, Preferred Provider Organizations: Performance, Problems,
and Promise, 4 HEALTH AFF., Spr. 1985, at 24, 26.
37. To avoid the over-treatment problem, utilization review could be used to monitor
the provision of services, evaluate provider performance, and deny payment for unnecessary
treatment. If such denials failed to provide a sufficient disincentive, the insurance carrier
could cancel or refuse to renew the PPO contract. Since such an action would result in
disrupting patient services and general confusion as to which physicians are in a PPO, a fee
cap might be a better means to control over-treatment.
38. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (maximum-fee
setting by physicians who were members of two medical foundations was held to be a per se
violation); Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982) (patient has standing to sue for an
anti-trust violation when Blue Shield refused to reimburse for psychological services provided
by a clinical psychologist which would be covered if provided through a physician or by a
psychiatrist). See generally Blacker, Preferred Provider Organizations, 6 WHfrPER L. REV.
691, 694-95 (1984).
39. Nine states (California, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ne-
braska, Virginia, and Wisconsin) have enacted laws permitting prepaid health plans that po-
tentially or actually limit choice of provider. Fifteen states have pending legislation.
Congress also has considered legislation that would override state laws inhibiting these health
plans. See Gabel & Ermann, supra note 36, at 28-29.
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ing the number of units employed. Thus, reducing the price of units
of service may merely cause an increase in the number of units pro-
vided.' Plainly, such an increase has different connotations if it
results from physicians' providing service to a larger number of pa-
tients, 4' than if it results from physicians' providing the same pa-
tients with more services for the same diseases that merely yields
the same health outcomes.
Several proposals have been set forth to overcome or ameliorate
this problem.42 One payment method involves the packaging or
"bundling" of services for reimbursement purposes. This method
seeks to avoid excessive treatment because it is directly aimed at
overcoming the present incentives to "unbundle" services.
The current Medicare coding system identifies 7,040 individual
services for which physicians may bill HCFA.43 Similar rules are
followed in many private plans. Consequently, physicians are moti-
vated to bill for treatment based upon individual services rather
than as a package or "bundle." This "unbundling" results in higher
costs. Physicians also are motivated to code procedures as if they
were more complex than they actually are resulting in "Code
Creep" with corresponding higher expenditures.'
A broad spectrum of packages could be developed to eliminate
these practices. At one end of the spectrum is fee-for-each-individ-
ual-service. At the other extreme is totally capitated payments re-
quring a physician to provide all services needed by an enrolled
patient. Ambulatory care packages could be designed to combine
physician and ancillary service costs; similarly, diagnostic and ther-
apeutic procedures could be combined in the same package. A
package might cover a single office visit or encompass a single ill-
ness or episode of care extending over several visits, thus reducing
both cost and paperwork.
In-patient packages could likewise be developed to cover all
physician services for a particular hospitalization. More compre-
40. See J. KRONEFELD & M. WHICKER, U.S. NATIONAL HEALTH POLICY: AN ANAL-
YSIS OF THE FEDERAL ROLE 120-22, 131-33 (1984); Newhouse, A Model of Physician Pric-
ing, 37 S. ECON. J. 174 (1970).
41. See Feldstein, Hospital Cost Inflation: A Study of Nonprofit Price Dynamics, 61 Am.
ECOM. REV. 853 (1971); Evans, Supplier Induced Demand: Some Empirical Evidence and
Implications, in THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH AND MEDICAL CARE (M. Perlman ed. 1974).
42. Several programs operate by exposing physicians to financial penalties if they overu-
tilize services. These are discussed under the heading of financial risk. See infra text accom-
panying notes 52-73.
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(V)(1)(A) (1982).
44. Jencks & Dobson, supra note 20, at 1495.
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hensive packages could be developed to combine physician, ancil-
lary, and hospital services. In order to prevent unnecessary
hospital-based services, a "service window" could be imposed to
cover services before admission and after discharge."a This would
encourage outpatient provision of services, removing any incentive
to keep the patient hospitalized longer than necessary.
The combination of packaging physician services and prospec-
tive payment has been characterized as physician diagnosis-related
groups (MDDRGs).46 MDDRGs would establish a single fee for
all physician services provided during one hospital stay. The MD-
DRG rates could be determined on a competitive basis or by using a
relative value scale, based initially on current allowable charges and
later nationally standardized charges. Three different payment
methods for MDDRGs have been identified: (a) paying the physi-
cian; (b) paying the medical staff; and (c) paying the hospital.47
Under the first method, the carrier pays the attending physician
who is then responsible for paying all other consultants. This
method motivates the attending physician to reduce the use of con-
sultants (and the provision of services generally) in order to increase
the retained share of the fee.
The second payment option credits the medical staff with the
insurer's share of average allowable charges. The medical staff then
pays its physicians at a rate which reflects the difference between
the total MDDRG credits and the total allowable charges by the
staff.48 Alternatively, the medical staff could be given the MDDRG
payments to distribute. The medical staff might also be subdivided
to increase the incentives to contain costs within each subdivision.49
The final method of implementing an MDDRG program links
the payment to the amount paid to hospitals under the DRG pro-
gram for Medicare patients. The hospital could then allocate funds
for physician services. Funds could be distributed through a medi-
45. Id.
46. MDDRGs would extend the Diagnosis-Related Groups (DRGs) system currently
employed by Medicare for prospective payment of hospital services. DRGs are diagnostic
related categories, grouped by body area into approximately 468 DRGs. The average price
and weight of the procedure are multiplied to determine payment. Tichon, Current Issues in
Reimbursement: Medicare and Medicaid, 6 WHri-MER L. REV. 851 (1984).
47. Jencks & Dobson, supra note 20, at 1496.
48. If the charges exceed the credit, the dollar value could be discounted; if charges were
less than the credit, the dollar value could be inflated.
49. Special care is required in designing and administering a subdivision of a program or
individual physicians will not be motivated to limit provision of services, since their individ-
ual income would increase with increased billing. Utilization review and group performance
rewards could provide such an incentive.
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cal staff model (as previously described) or through a physician con-
tract. The contract could require a base salary for routine medical
duties and a scheduled fee for non-routine medical duties and a
scheduled fee for non-routine services."0 Base salaries could be de-
termined by negotiation or bid, or adjusted based on specialty, expe-
rience, or seniority (years of Medicare service). Physician salaries
could be further manipulated by providing incentives based on the
number of cases seen, hours worked, profits generated, or revenue
produced.
Like other types of prospective payment schemes, the packaging
of services in a MDDRG, while avoiding certain overutilization
problems, has certain potential risks. First, the plan rewards inge-
nuity in dividing patient problems into separate parts, each treated
as a distinct episode and requiring a separate set of office visits or
hospital admission. Second, since the most seriously ill patients re-
quire the heaviest use of physician time and other resources, these
patients would face the greatest problems in obtaining care. How-
ever, this is less of a problem when the physician group is large. A
plan that pays the medical staff or hospital, rather than a single
physician, offers greater opportunity to distribute the burdens im-
posed by one or more patients who need an unusually large amount
of medical attention. Finally, the plan encourages the payment re-
cipients to find some means to shift costs to others. For example, an
individual physician might use the resources available in the hospi-
tal (such as ordering lab tests instead of paying for a consult, or
using hospital-based physicians instead of outside consultants) even
though such choices are inefficient from a systemic viewpoint, un-
less charges are imposed.
The greatest barrier to the use of payment packages, however, is
technical. Although similar to the single fees paid to obstetricians
for childbirth, or to surgeons for all their services still treating a
particular problem, the packaging of all services would be quite
novel. It has been noted that "because of the lack of experience
and, in some cases, usable payment categories, the options with this
strategy call for research to develop categories or demonstrations to
evaluate the effects of packaged payment."'"
50. Reduced access to individual physicians could result if physicians try to obtain ex-
clusive contracts with a hospital that is the area's sole funding source. Additionally, quality
of care could suffer in a bidding war as the physicians attempt to stay within their agreed-
upon budget.
51. PAYMENT FOR PHYSICIAN SERVICES, supra note 24. Simulated MDDRG pay-
ments using Medicare claims from four states suggest that while surgical in-patient costs may
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3. Shifting Financial Risks to Physicians
Employers, insurance companies, and the federal government
have used capitated payments as a means to shift risks to others.
Physicians receiving direct payments are financially exposed; how-
ever, if the payments are to organizations, they may forge various
links with physicians to share the risk. 2
Thus far, organizations have indirectly exposed physicians to fi-
nancial risks in two ways: (1) by providing financial incentives and
disincentives through organizational arrangements, and (2) by plac-
ing restrictions on physicians' decisionmaking power. Financial in-
centives and disincentives arise in a variety of arrangements; a
physician with an ownership interest in a group practice will at-
tempt to avoid extravagant treatment choices, as would a physician
who has a joint-venture with a hospital 3 or who has a "bonus"
arrangement with an HMO, where the surplus from "cost-effective"
care is shared with the physician. 4
Programs restricting a physician's decisionmaking power have
developed over the past few years to control hospital costs. Such
programs allow hospitals to
monitor physicians' spending patterns over time and, where
high-spending physicians refuse to curtail their ordering habits,
revoke their privileges to practice at that hospital. It can identify
its most expensive products, services, and technologies, and place
restrictions on their use. Physicians, for instance, might be re-
quired to apply to a utilization committee for specific approval
each time they wish to order an expensive test. Or where a phy-
be quite similar, medical admissions costs vary substantially. The differences found were
systematically related to specialties: medical and some surgical specialists would lose money
while general practitioners and ophthalmologists would gain. Mitchell, Physician DRGs, 313
NEw ENG. J. MED. 670 (1985).
52. Alternatively, the capitated payment may become one of the means of cost-contain-
ment of physician's fees if the organization uses its large number of enrollees as clout to
negotiate favorable rates with physicians and other providers.
53. A joint venture may in many ways be the most advantageous arrangement for both
the physician and the hospital.
The hospital is the organization the doctor is most familiar with. It offers a capital-
generating capacity that most groups of physicians would find hard to match. It
already has in place mechanisms physicians need to operate effectively--systems for
quality assurance and utilization review, in particular ... joint ventures facilitate
cooperation in three major areas: payment schemes, ambulatory care net working,
and professional integration.
Elwood, When MDs meet DRGs, 57 Hosp. 62, 62-63 (1983). See also Morreim, The MD and
the DRG, 15 HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1985, at 30, 34-35.
54. Cf Capron & Gray, supra note 4 ("[I]ncreasing attention is being paid to arrange-
ments by which hospitals would offer economic rewards to physicians whose patient-care
decisions help restrain the hospital's expenses.").
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sician is judged to overuse a particular technology, the hospital
might monitor or restrict his privilege to use that particular
technology."
Some of these strategeis may be ineffective or even legally ques-
tionable5 6 in attempting to influence physicians to help control insti-
tutional expenses. However, in the context of changing the
methods of paying for physicians' services, some payment methods
offer considerable scope for such influences to work, either indi-
rectly, such as physician-employees in hospital-based programs and
HMOs or directly for ambulatory services provided by physicians
participating in a capitated program.
The organization of physicians most associated with capitation
is the form of prepaid group practice (PGP) known as a health
maintenance organization.57 All HMOs share certain characteris-
tics: voluntary enrollment, which defines the population served by
the HMO, and premiums not tied to the patient's actual use of serv-
ices. Consequently, HMOs assume part of the financial risk.5
PGPs are health practices which employ physicians (staff
model) or contract with physician groups (group model) to provide
health care services to enrollees in exchange for prepaid premi-
ums.5 9 The physicians are generally salaried, and may be rewarded
or penalized for their performance with respect to HMO targets. 6°
Physicians work full time for the PGP and primarily serve the pre-
paid enrollees.61 A PGP generally owns its facilities, and the physi-
55. Morreim, supra note 53, at 34.
56. Hall, Hospitals and Doctors Clash Over Efforts by Administrators to Cut Medicare
Costs, Wall St. J., Jan. 19, 1984, at 33, col. 3 ("Revoking hospital privileges for economic
reasons is controversial and legally largely untested.").
57. A second type of HMO is the independent practice association (IPA). ]PAS are
similar to PGPs in that most of an IPA enrollee's health care costs are covered by prepaid
premiums. They differ, however, in several ways. IPAs seldom involve insurance type risks
for their physician participants. Physicians are paid on a fee-for-service basis, according to a
schedule of fees negotiated by the IPA administrators. L. BROWN, POLITICS AND HEALTH
CARE ORGANIZATIONS: HMOs AS FEDERAL POLICY 34 (1983). IPAs rarely own facilities.
Patients are seen in physicians' private offices and are sent to private clinics and hospitals. lIl
Generally, only a small amount of an IPA-participating physician's practice will consist of
prepaid HMO patients. Id. If a patient discontinues enrollment in an IPA, the patient may
continue to see the physician on a fee-for-service basis. Id. Although IPAs have the potential
for effective utilization review and control-and can operate like PGPs-they generally oper-
ate like fee-for-service practice. Id.
58. H. LuFr, HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS: DIMENSIONS OF PERFORM-
ANCE 2-3 (1981).
59. BROWN, supra note 57, at 33; Wolinsky, The Performance of Health Maintenance
Organizations: An Analytic Review, 58 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 537, 546 (1980).
60. BROWN, supra note 57, at 33.
61. Id.
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cians therefore usually work in the PGP's clinics and hospitals.62
Physicians in PGPs may make less money then fee-for-service prov-
iders, but are attracted by other benefits such as fixed schedules,
guaranteed income, fewer administrative burdens, and fringe bene-
fits including malpractice insurance, retirement plans, sick days,
time off, and funds for continuing education.6 3 However, negative
aspects of PGP practice have been identified as loss of the physi-
cian's freedom to schedule and manage care, patients who demand
care for trivial complaints, and lack of acceptance by community
fee-for-service physicians."
HMO income accrues from prepaid premiums. Consequently,
HMOs are able to budget provision of services in advance. As total
income is generally limited by premium payments, HMOs have
strong incentives to control costs and no incentives to provide un-
necessary or marginal care. Costs can be controlled by giving phy-
sicians an economic stake in the HMO's success, utilization review
of physicians, limiting access to hospital beds and consultants, the
use of allied health professionals, and controlling enrollment. Stud-
ies of HMOs suggest that overall costs for care are ten to forty per-
cent lower than conventional insurance;6" hospitalization rates are
up to forty-five percent lower;6 6 and quality of care appears to be as
good as conventional insurance. However, there appears to be no
agreement on how these savings are achieved. This is largely due to
the diversity among HMO programs and the variety of factors that
have been evaluated.
Furthermore, HMO proponents contend that HMO physicians
are better informed, more motivated, regularly monitored, lack the
administrative and business distractions of private practice, and are
free to "simply practice medicine."68 HMO critics note that HMO
policies can lead to under-provision of needed services, increased
caseloads, and extensive queuing for services. 9 Physicians may
hesitate to recommend expensive lab tests and treatment procedures
62. Iat This particular feature is often considered essential to the "pure" PGP. Id
63. Id at 51.
64. Potential fee-for-service physician responses to HMO physicians include: abusive
phone calls and mail; denial of hospital privileges; cut-off of referrals; disappearance of pa-
tients' files; harassment at meetings. Id at 54.
65. Luft, supra note 58, at 387. See also Wolinsky, supra note 59, at 544.
66. Wolinsky, supra note 59, at 544.
67. Id
68. Brown, supra note 57, at 130.
69. See Schneider & Stem, Health Maintenance Organizations and the Poor: Problems
and Prospects, 70 Nw. U.L REV. 90, 98-99 (1975) ("[I]n practice, an HMO may, absent
appropriate safeguards, seek to cut costs by reducing the amount of services provided
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for fear that utilization reviews will identify them as "over-provid-
ers"-a label which may adversely affect the physician's pay raises
or yearly bonuses.7" Physicians may feel overworked and exploited
when confronted with the increased caseloads necessary to make
the HMO financially viable, resulting in impersonal, mechanical pa-
tient care.7 Ironically, the decreased physician time spent with
each patient can even result in failure to detect conditions in their
early stages, which directly conflicts with the goals of preventive
medicine.72
Finally, the patient may experience delays in obtaining services
as a result of the physician's increased caseload. While some queu-
ing may be desirable, extended delay may lead to failure to detect
problems at an early stage, and ultimately to more costly care.
Queuing has also been used as a method to encourage disenrollment
of high risk patients; when needed care is hard to obtain, the patient
is likely to seek it elsewhere.73 HMO advocates insist that these
problems are monitored and remedied by the peer review process.
II. CHANGES IN ORGANIZATION OF HEALTH CARE
A. Pressures on Hospitals and Physicians to Change
In addition to directly changing the physician-payment meth-
ods, cost-containment efforts also alter the organizational frame-
work in which care is provided. The resulting changes in the
patient-physician-hospital relationship are likely to have pro-
nounced effects on "physician autonomy." Because of this "auton-
omy" and the fractionated character of the health care "system,"
the medical profession has maintained its dominance. For the past
half-century, physicians have used their authority as health care
gatekeepers (particularly of hospital admissions) to resist hospitals'
and insurers' efforts to influence the type and extent of patient
through such rationing devices as low physician-patient ratios, underbedding, or unduly re-
strictive prior authorization procedures.") (footnotes omitted).
70. Brown, supra note 57, at 140.
71. Since a HMO physician's salary is fixed there is no incentive to work "overtime." In
contrast, the fee-for-service physician's income increases in direct proportion to the patient
caseload. While the fee-for-service physician may view increased caseload as a sign of confi-
dence and a reward for good work, the HMO physician is likely to feel exploited by the
administratively increased caseload. Id. at 146-48.
72. Id. at 147.
73. Id. at 139. Control methods have included: restoring fees for some services; requir-
ing primary care physician referrals; use of physician's assistants and nurses to provide care
or screen patients; requiring telephone consultations before granting appointments; and sim-
ply telling members not to waste physician's time. Id. at 16-64.
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treatment.74
Today, the relative balance of authority is dramatically shifting.
While once, "the profession's authority [put] at its disposal the
purchasing power of its patients, '75 that power is increasingly
wielded by large organizations, driven by the perceived need to hold
down health care costs, an objective proven impossible so long as
physicians controlled the system. In particular, in this increasingly
competitive environment, insurers with large subscriber bases are
able to exert considerable influence over physicians' practice pat-
terns, and many physicians are willing to comply with restrictions
so they do not lose substantial numbers of patients.
Recent actions by a large HMO in Minneapolis illustrate the
changes that an insurer can bring about when it holds a strong posi-
tion in a competitive market for health care services. 76 The Minne-
apolis experience is particularly interesting because it also illustrates
the greater competitive potential that arises when physicians' tradi-
tional collective control is challenged.
The Physician Health Plan (PHP), the HMO in question, is of
the IPA type.77 Beginning in March of 1986, the 58,000 Medicare
enrollees of its 326,000 enrollees are covered by a "risk" contract
with the federal government. PHP receives a fixed monthly fee to
provide the enrollees' medical and hospital care. In order to control
hospital as well as physician expenses, PHP selected nine hospitals,
geographically distributed in the service area, which could offer
comprehensive services. The hospitals agreed to share the risk of
providing care within the predicted cost limits, thereby motivating
them to control costs. Medicare enrollees were told that if they se-
lected one of the nine preferred hospitals they would obtain extra
benefits (such as a private room, preventive dental care, and subsi-
dized eyewear, which are not usually covered by Medicare) and
74. P. STARR, supra note 1, at 26.
75. Id.
76. Scheier, Twin City MDs fight IPA hospital contracts, Am. Med. News, Feb. 28, 1986,
at 1, col. 4.
77. Id. Because such groups are comprised of affiliated, rather than employed, physi-
cians, they are usually more deferential to physicians' wishes, and the PHP itself was created
by the Hennepin County Medical Society in 1976. Id. Had it remained a creature of the
Medical Society, its recent actions probably would not have occurred, but the Society was
forced by the Federal Trade Commission to relinquish control several years ago. Id. The
importance of the present example is magnified because PHP is one of 36 HMOs managed
nationwide by United HealthCare. They may introduce select-hospital plans under other
Medicare-risk contracts if the markets for HMO-enrollment in other locales become as com-
petitive as Minneapolis, which is "more mature from a competitive and price competition
standpoint." Id. at 24, col. 3.
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would pay a premium of only $15.00 per month. If enrollees
wished to obtain care at one of fifteen other hospitals, their premi-
ums would be $22.50 per month. The third option-freedom to
select among all fifty-nine hospitals statewide-required a $29.10
monthly premium.78
Managers of excluded hospitals not only protested their exclu-
sion from the selection process, but also advertised in newspapers,
not only to retain the Medicare business but to combat any public
impression that the preferred hospitals are generally "better" insti-
tutions. Hospitals in the region have reason to be concerned about
losing market share, since occupancy levels are already just forty-
five percent.79
PHP's new Medicare plan puts even greater pressure on physi-
cians than on hospitals, since many hospitals were already being
pushed by general market forces to consider closing or merging.80
The nine hospitals already accounted for about half of PHP's Medi-
care enrollees admissions. 81 Physicians who are not primarily affili-
ated with one of these nine hospitals must decide whether to switch
their affiliation or to stop treating patients who choose the low-pre-
mium option.82
B. Medicine and the Marketplace
The changes in health care organization and relationships
brought about by cost-containment efforts illustrated by the Min-
neapolish PHP situation should not be surprising. Altering the way
physicians are paid obviously affects their incentives to employ par-
ticular procedures, including the services of health care colleagues
and institutions.
Moreover, the effects of current efforts to contain physicians'
services expenditures are likely to be magnified because health care
is an increasingly business-oriented activity. This is largely due to
the rising importance of for-profit institutions in this field. Clearly,
for-profit activities have long been an important part of health care,
from the manufacture and marketing of drugs and medical equip-
ment to the traditional physician's fee-for-service practice. Yet the
field as a whole has retained a not-for-profit aura, largely due to the
visible role played by hospitals, most of which are not-for-profit in-
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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stitutions. In the past decade, however, "a vigorous and varied for-
profit sector has developed in the predominantly not-for-profit
world of medical care." 3 This sector is made up of independent
medical facilities, such as ambulatory surgery centers, often owned
by local investors (including physicians), and of large publicly
traded hospital and nursing chains.
The emergence of the for-profit institutions since the late-1960's
has had profound, though not yet widely recognized, effects. The
first is the creation of a number of powerful companies with the
potential for significant effects on health care policy. Interestingly,
the growth of the for-profit chains has only slightly increased the
number of for-profit hospitals, since much of this growth has come
through acquisition of existing proprietary hospitals (typically
"Doctors' Hospitals," owned and operated by local physicians).84
The structure of the new investor-owned organizations is more sig-
nificant than the numbers. Today, the chains own about ten percent
of United States hospitals and manage another four percent, while
independent for-profit hosptials account for another five percent.8 5
Second, the growth of the for-profit chains has accelerated the
move toward a greater role for management (instead of physicians)
in health care decisionmaking. The apparent success of the inves-
tor-owned companies in mapping profitable strategies, combined
with the pressures to reduce costs throughout health care, has led
many not-for-profits to form chains of their own and to give manag-
ers greater control in running the institutions.8 6 Even a not-for-
profit facility must be profitable to survive, a realization that has led
many hospitals to implement tighter controls over physicians and
to establish profit-making subsidiaries and joint-ventures with
physicians.8 7
Third, in subtle ways the world of health care has fundamen-
tally changed. "Market shares" and "profit centers" mark a new
vocabulary which "would have seemed foreign in the health policy
world only a few years ago."8 8 The business-medical care mixture
is bound to increase as the major hospital chains continue to expand
recently developed integrated health care programs. These pro-
83. Gray, An Introduction to the New Health Care for Profit, in THE NEW HEALTH
CARE FOR PROFIT: DOCTORS AND HOSPITALS IN A COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT I (B.
Gray ed. 1983).
84. Id. at 2.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 3.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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grams provide everything from routine outpatient care to hospitali-
zation at specialized facilities owned by the company, all
encompassed within a health-insurance program.s9
The rise of independent treatment and diagnosis centers in
which physicians are often major investors, as yet a less widely rec-
ognized effect, is an important ethical change.
Free-standing investor-owned ambulatory surgical centers
are springing up everywhere. To increase the use of their facili-
ties, which are often in competition with similar units in the com-
munity hospitals, these companies offer local surgeons a share in
the profits. Some ambulatory surgical centers are owned by the
surgeons who use the facility, and they share in the profits from
its use.90 The partnership of physicians and venture capitalists is
not limited to surgery; it extends to radiologists establishing
CAT scanning and magnetic resonance imaging centers,91 and
ophthalmologists holding stock in intraocular lense companies.
92
III. THE ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PAYMENT CHANGES
Two strategies are advisable based on the absence of any means
for making reliable and quantifiable predictions about the impact
that changes in third-party payments to physicians might have on
the quality of care and on patients' access to care.93 The first strat-
egy requires the creation of research programs to establish the
means of measuring such effects. This step is recognized as essential
by health care planners and economists. 94
The second strategy, which is the object of this Article, proposes
other, nonquantitative criteria to evaluate the implications of the
various ways third parties could pay physicians. Three such crite-
ria, described in ethical terms, are physicians' fidelity to patients,
89. See, e.g., Special Report, Competition Grows as Increasing Number of Providers
Enter Insurance Business, 19 FED. AM. HosP. REv. 18 (1986).
90. Relman, Dealing with Conflicts of Interest, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 749 (1985).
91. Id. at 749-50.
92. Id. at 750.
93. See PAYMENT FOR PHYSICIAN SERVICES, supra note 27, at 33-35 (summarizing the
advantages, disadvantage and uncertain ramifications of four strategies to change Medicare
payment for physician services: present payment arrangements, fee schedules, packages of
services, and capitation payment).
94. See, e.g., Hammons, Brook & Newhouse, Evaluation of Effects of the Quality of Care
Of Selected Alternatives for Paying Physicians under the Medicare Program (OTA Back-
ground Paper) 70-71 (1985) (concluding that not enough is known to quantify the effects of
changing the physician payment system on quality of care, especially since relatively little is
known about the quality of our present system of care. Given the inability to predict the
effects of change on quality of care, the authors recommend that when changes are imple-
mented or tested in demonstrations, the quality of care be carefully monitored).
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fairness of the system to physicians, and fairness of the system to
patients.
Although these variables do not exhaust the ethical implications
of the various payment systems, these particular variables have been
carefully selected. Thus, a discussion of the ethical dimensions
themselves is appropriate before analyzing their relationship to vari-
ous payment options.
A. Physician Fidelity To Patient Interests
Medicine is grounded on ethical premises and probably could
not operate without the articulation of those premises. Ethical
strictures are necessary because of the subject matter of medicine
involves the human body and its functioning. One author has noted
that "professionally imposed restrictions on deed and speech grow
out of the recognition that illness is inherently degrading and dehu-
manizing, and that it exposes and threatens the sick person's body,
soul, and intimate relationships."9
Western ethical traditions, which rest on respect for persons,
value privacy, bodily integrity, and personal autonomy.96 Touch-
ings of others are permitted only with their permission, and bodily
intimacies are usually limited to members of one's own family.9 7
Physicians and other health care professionals are exceptions to
this rule. By seeking medical treatment a person gives implied per-
mission for manipulation of his body by someone who is otherwise a
stranger and shares with this person many private facts, both those
discovered through examination and those conveyed verbally by the
patient.98 Moreover, procedures used by physicians may involve
grave risks to patients' life or health. Misuse of these powers by
persons who do not adhere to standards of decency and dedication
to the welfare of those they treat could cause suffering or death.
As a result, the medical profession has always requried its mem-
bers to keep patient information confidential. Furthermore, the
very precept of professionalism99 is rooted in ethics because bodily
sanctity can only be interfered with when the actor is a qualified
95. L. KASS, TOWARD A MORE NATURAL SCIENCE: BIOLOGY AND HUMAN AFFAIRS
222 (1985).
96. See generally T. PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM (1951).
97. Id.
98. See id. at 453 ("[Ihe situation of medical practice is such as inevitably to 'involve'
the physician in the psychologically significant 'private' affairs of his patients.")
99. See generally E. FREIDSON, supra note 24. One definition of professionalism is self-
regulation by a group that meets standards of knowledge and training and adheres to stan-
dards of conduct.
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member of a professional group, with the requisite skill, learning,
and dedication to patient welfare. The sensitive aspect of medical
care is closely connected to the second relationship of ethics to
medicine, namely, the physician-patient relationship. The nature
of the material over which the physician has control is both per-
sonal and technologically sophisticated, which creates an imbalance
between physician and patient. Although many patients have and
use the power to choose one physician over another, once involved
in a physician-patient relationship, the physician's technical superi-
ority endows him or her with significant power over the patient.
Furthermore, patients are understandably less knowledgeable than
physicians about their health care needs and about alternative
means of meeting those needs. Indeed, patients are relatively more
ignorant in choosing who, where, how (and often, when) health care
will be supplied than they are about most other choices affecting
their lives. "o
Although the "doctor knows best" rhetoric is no longer as force-
ful as it once was, °1' and despite "consumerism" and the legal re-
quirements of informed consent, physicians remain remarkablely
resistant to sharing information-much less authority- with their
patients. 102
The primacy of the patient's interests lies at the heart of the
physician-patient relationship. In the Hippocratic tradition, this
was expressed as primum non nocere ("first do no harm"), which
was largely a reflection of the limited value of available medical in-
terventions, rather than an affirmative limitation on the physician.
That traditional ethical code's central tenet was protection of the
patient. Physicians have recognized the need since early times-
for principled as well as practical reasons- to establish a profes-
sional standard of fidelity to individual patient's interests. Duties
of fidelity may stem from the generation of expectations through
words, gestures, or silence. Promises or contracts-whether made
explicitly, implicity, or tacitly-are binding for physicians, other
health care professionals, and researchers, except when they are
100. Feldstein, Research on the Demand for Health Services, 44 MILBANK MEMORIAL
FUND Q. 128, 138 (1966).
The physician, not the patient, combines the components of care into a treatment.
In other markets the consumer, with varying degrees of knowledge selects the
goods and services he desires from the available alternatives. In medical care, how-
ever, the patient does not usually make this choice directly .... [H]e selects a
physician who then makes ... choices for him.
101. See C. CHAPMAN, PHYSICIANS, LAW, AND ETHICS (1984).
102. See J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984).
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overridden by stronger duties or obligations.10 3
1. Appropriate Care
Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that physicians are as per-
fect as their ideals. Thus, it would be naive to assume that physi-
cians' behavior under existing reimbursement methods fully adheres
to the principle of fidelity. Were perfect fidelity the case, the ques-
tion would simply be the degree of deviation resulting from alterna-
tive reimbursement procedures. But such an assumption would be
mistaken. The historical record makes clear that the medical pro-
fession has taken many steps aimed to promote the interests of the
profession."° Indeed, even third-party payment mechanisms- and
especially the limitations on the methods of payment under such
mechanisms-are directed toward enhancing the well-being and au-
thority of the profession.
In light of the recognized risk that physicians may not behave
ideally, how is one to know whether a particular physician is faith-
ful? Clearly, one cannot look to outcome alone, otherwise, the phy-
sician whose patients' natural good health (or self-limiting illnesses)
creates little need for the physician's ministrations would appear to
be providing the best care. Conversely, the physician who at-
tempted to save the lives of the sickest patients would falsely appear
to be doing the greatest disservice. Nor is it possible to permit pa-
tients to be the sole judge of fidelity, because they lack expertise and
may be impressed by the "bedside manner" of a physician who is
doing them no good or may reject the care of someone else who is
actually employing the appropriate means.
Yet it is exactly on this point that the technical difficulties in-
trude. The practice of medicine is characterized by large differences
in the rates at which various techniques are utilized. 05 Rather than
reflecting variations in individual competence or personal idiosyn-
cracies, technical differences vary by locality, even after adjusted for
differences in the patient mix. Moreover, no marked variations
have been found in the mortality rate or reported disease incidence
in the areas studied.' °6 Some of the differences in frequency are so
great (up to eight or nine-fold) as to render the notion of "standard,
accepted practice" of dubious value. This means that for some pro-
103. T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS 239 (2d ed.
1983).
104. See generally P. STARR, supra note 1, at 79-144, 235-334.
105. See Wennberg & Gittlesobn, supra note 17.
106. See Wennberg, supra note 17.
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cedures it is apparently professionally acceptable to have many
times as many surgical procedures of a particular type per capita
compared to a neighboring community. Furthermore, the authors
of one recent study of this phenomenon pointed out that even the
lowest current rate may not be the appropriate rate because physi-
cians in all geographic areas in the state may be doing too much of
the procedures. 10 7 Conversely, even the highest rate may be too
low.
Thus, individual judgment, and a corresponding degree of arbi-
trariness, underlies the central ethical principle of fidelity.
Although the choices made are often subsumed under the heading
of "professional judgment," this term is misleading. It suggests that
a highly individualized application of generally accepted norms of
practice is involved, when in fact the profession has left large areas
of "proper practice" largely undefined.'0 8 Moreover, to the extent
that more than personal judgment is involved, decisions may be
guided by informal protocols that have grown up without careful
examination or scientific basis.' 09 Outside of medical schools and
teaching hospitals, such informal and unproven medical habits
spread from colleague to colleague, probably accounting for the
wide variations from one community to the next in the frequency of
common procedures like Cesarean section, hysterectomy, and
tonsillectomy.
Of course, there are means to identify practitioners whose efforts
are so adverse to the best interests of their patients (though usually
from lack of skill or attention instead of conscious choice) as to be
"negligent." These means exist both within the profession and
through the courts. But these methods are cumbersome and are
usually invoked only after a very bad result has occurred." 0
107. Barnes, O'Brien & Comstock, Report on Variations in Rates of Utilization of Surgical
Services in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 254 J. A.M.A. 371, 374 (1985).
108. See Komaroff, The Doctor, the Hospital, and the Definition of Proper Medical Prac-
tice, in 3 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIROAL RESEARCH, SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE
225, 232-34 (1983) [hereinafter cited as SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE].
109. Wong & Lincoln, "Readyl Fire!... Aiml" 250 J. A.M.A. 2510, 2511 (1983) ("[ald
hoc routines develop and subsequently acquire authority and autonomous lives as informal
protocols. Without any apparent critique or review, they are passed on from resident to
resident and to medical student as a kind of folklore").
110. This mode of selection may be very biased. It may include some cases of bad out-
come that are not in the least due to physician negligence and may exclude other cases in
which an outcome was, fortuitously, not as bad as was risked by the physician's conduct.
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2. Trust
Fidelity to the patient's interests means more than simply pro-
viding care of acceptable quality, even assuming that the contours
of "acceptable quality" were clearly discernible. Patients expect
their physician to respect their moral limits, promote their welfare,
and favorably balance the prospective benefit and harm in prescrib-
ing care.111 In seeking medical care, a patient selects a physician
whom she can "confide in." One author has interpreted this to
mean "that the relationship is expected to be one of mutual trust, of
the belief that the physician is trying his best to help the patient and
that conversely the patient is cooperating with him to the best of his
ability."
1 12
The trust relationship has been described as a covenant or con-
tractual relationship. "The structure of the contract has tended to
increase not only the physician's technical authority, but also his
'moral' influence." ' x The physician's authority is clearly under-
mined when he fails to honor this contract, either by violating an
explicit ethical rule or by departing from the implicit purpose of the
relationship (as by providing inadequate treatment because of cost
constraints or providing excessive treatment to increase income).
Breach of this contract violates the patient's trust." 4
Conversely, when physicians demonstrate their commitment to
the trust relationship, the patient feels comfortable in seeking treat-
ment. It has even been found that many patients experience thera-
111. T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note 103, at 120.
112. T. PARSONS, supra note 96, at 464. The patient's trust derives, in part, from the
special role which has been created for the physician. See also Gaylin, The Psychiatrist as
Double Agent, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1974, at 12, 13.
113. Mechanic, Therapeutic Relationship; Contemporary SociologicalAnalysis, in ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF BioETHics 1668 (W. Reich ed. 1978) (citing J. FRANK, PERSUASION AND
HEALING (rev. ed. 1973)):
Implicit in such a contract is that the physician can be trusted to treat the patient's
health needs and interests as central, thus minimizing the need for the patient to be
defensive or to withhold information. Both the status of the physician and the ethi-
cal bases of his practice facilitate the patient's willingness to put his health in the
hands of the physician with little demand for detailed explanations or monitoring of
the physician's decisions. This is not to imply that physicians have always con-
formed to these ethical mandates or that patients have generally been docile, but
only that the physician's authority has been assumed to be part of the ordinary
understanding of relationships between physicians and patients and their respective
responsibilities.
114. C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 16
(1981). An individual is morally bound to keep promises because he or she has intentionally
invoked a convention whose function it is to give grounds-moral grounds-for another to
expect the promised performance. To renege is to abuse a confidence one was free to invite or
not, and which was intentionally invited. Id.
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peutic benefits resulting from trust in their physician and her
judgment.11 5
The legal underpinnings of this trust relationship was recog-
nized in Canterbury v. Spence.' 1 6 In articulating a physician's duty
to disclose material information to a patient before seeking the pa-
tient's consent, the court stated:
The patient's reliance upon the physician is a trust of the kind
which traditionally has exacted obligations beyond those associ-
ated with arms-length transactions. His dependence upon the
physician for information affecting his well-being, in terms of
contemplated treatment, is well-nigh abject .... [L]ong before
the instant litigation arose, courts had recognized that the physi-
cian had the responsibility of satisfying the vital information
needs of the patient. More recently, we ourselves have found in
the fiducial qualities of [the physician-patient] relationship the
physician's duty to reveal to the patient that which in his best
interests it is important that he should know." 7
Fulfilling the medical interests of patients, as they themselves
define them, is the criterion for successful medicine. Patients' ex-
pectations of the promotion of their interests through medicine, in-
deed, the very definition of those interests, depend on the quality of
the patients' trust relationship with their physicians.
Issues of patients' trust in the health care system, rather than
solely in their individual physician, may be particularly important
in the current cost-containment environment. These issues take on
a special twist in light of another aspect of "trust" in health care.
"Trust" is an ambiguous word in medical ethics. It is touted as
the moral basis of the patient-physician relationship, yet is also
the foundation of the collegial relationship of one physician to
another and of physicians to other members of the health care
team. The Hippocractic oath is first of all an oath of secrecy and
loyalty to one's medical colleagues." 8
To the extent that peer review of the adequacy and appropriate-
ness of diagnosis and treatment plays a significant role in the suc-
cess of a particular Medicare reimbursement system, "trust" may
assume contradictory meanings. Patients trust that they will learn
everything medically important about the care being received in-
cluding the ways in which the care may have been inadequate or
inappropriate; physicians trust that their medical colleagues will not
115. E. FRIEDSON, supra note 24, at 263-68.
116. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
117. Id. at 782.
118. R. VEATCH, CASE STUDIES IN MEDICAL ETHICS 113 (1977).
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harm their relationships with patients by revealing their errors or
professional inadequacies.
This problem is not unique to new forms of reimbursement and
can also arise in fee-for-service medicine. However, the growth of
formal review mechanisms accompanying prospective and capitated
payment systems is likely to increase not merely the recognition of
instances of medically improper or inadequate care, but also pa-
tients' understandable sense of being misled if they do not learn of
these inadequacies. It appears that HCFA's recent decision to re-
lease data on hospitals that have unusually high (or low) mortality
rates was provoked by public pressure. It is likely that the public's
perception is that it was wrong for people not to know what the
review mechanisms had allegedly discovered about the quality and
safety of various hospitals.
B. Fairness Among Physicians
Trust between physicians is only one dimension by which to
evaluate the reimbursement system's effects on providers. Fairness
of the rewards provided to different physicians for their professional
services is another, more central, issue. Defining equitable treat-
ment of physicians in the reimbursement system is difficult because
there is no simple appropriate "equal treatment" formula. A re-
ward standard based on a complexity of interventions may seem
appropriate, but the implementation of this standard creates its own
complicating distortions. Similarly, a formula based on the pre-
dicted value of an intervention to a patient's life rewards medical
"heroics." Such a standard leaves little incentive for many inter-
ventions that patients need and desire though their quantifiable
value is relatively slight or has simply never been demonstrated by
controlled studies.
An even more difficult issue is whether the focus should be the
procedure or the physician who performs it. The patient is primar-
ily concerned with the procedure and its outcome. From the pa-
tient's perspective, if an operation can be performed effectively by
either of two physicians, any skill, training, or other differences be-
tween them are irrelevant. A standard based on the procedure and
not the physician more closely resembles the usual market transac-
tion, and hence achieves an air of ethical neutrality.
Nonetheless, the medical system desires highly skilled pratition-
ers who operate at the frontiers of their field. If the extra invest-
ment of time and expense necessary to achieve an advanced level of
1986]
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proficiency and knowledge requires an extra reward, it may be de-
sirable. By overpaying for a simple procedure (that could be per-
formed equally well but for a lower fee by a nonspecialist), the
system subsidizes the development of specialists.
Such an arrangement may be ethically unobjectionable since the
nonspecialist's time is admittedly "less valuable" than that of the
specialist or subspecialist. Yet the extra financial reward seems un-
justified because (a) the reimbursement system is supposedly geared
to the value of procedures performed for patients, and
(b) reimbursement should be a reflection of appropriate input costs
(including the costs of extra training, etc.). The specialist who per-
forms a procedure that a less highly trained individual could do for
a much lower cost is choosing to follow a nonefficient use of his or
her own resources. The system ought to discourage such a choice.
Different financial rewards to physicians who live in different
locales or who provide different types of medical services, unlike
differences in the "quality" of medical care, can be reliably deter-
mined. However, assigning ethical significance to these differences
is an unresolved problem.
C. Patients' Access To Health Care
Patients' access to health care has characteristics that place it
somewhere between the other two criteria for evaluating alternative
payment methods in ethical terms. Similar to the fairness among
physicians criterion, it should be possible to generate quantitative
access data, although predictions regarding the impact of particular
payment methods on access are merely guesses about probable di-
rections, not quantitative conclusion about end points. Conversely,
although there is considerable disagreement as to its defintion, the
basic value of access, like the value of fidelity to patients' interests,
is not in question.
1. Patterns of Access to Care
Many Americans are surprised that despite enormous expendi-
tures of public and private funds, everyone is not encompassed by
this nation's health care "system." Access problems are not limited
to residents of rural or inner-city communities, nor are they limited
to the very poor, but even extend to low or middle income fami-
lies.' 9 Compared to people who are insured, people not covered by
119. 1 SECURING AccEss TO HEALTH CARE, supra note 108, at 92-100 (At any one time
22 to 25 million Americans lack health insurance, which amounts to 11 to 12.6% of the
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any form of private or public health insurance are less likely to seek
prompt medical care and are more likely to face substantial obsta-
cles in obtaining adequate care, particularly for chronic or other
nonemergency conditions.120
Is it significant that uninsured individuals use substantially
fewer health services, even though they are no less in need of
care.12 Despite skepticism about the efficacy of many medical pro-
cedures and the lack of agreed upon methods to evaluate the cost
effectiveness of medical techniques and practices, having access to
adequate health care can have dramatic results. Advances in health
care capabilities in this century have been accompanied by notable
increases in longevity and reductions in morbidity. More particu-
larly, recent reports demonstrate that utilization of medical care
leads to a marked reduction in mortality rates. 122
noninstitutionalized population. An even larger number, about 16%, are without insurance
at some point over the course of the year because some people lose their coverage due to
change in employment status or change in income (which determines eligibility for some
public programs)). Id.
120. See Davis & Rowland, Uninsured and Underserved Inequities in Health Care in the
U.S., in 3 SECURING AccEss TO HEALTH CARE, supra note 108, at 55-76.
The absence of health insurance is not evenly distributed across income groups. I SECUR-
ING AccEss TO HEALTH CARE, supra note 108, at 103-08 (of families with incomes below
$10,000, 27% lacked health insurance for all or part of the year). Among like families with
incomes exceeding $32,000, 90% were insured, and the uninsured 10% would clearly be
better able to meet health care costs using their own funds. Id. Indeed, in 1977, poorer
members of the population not only spent a larger proportion of their income for out-of-
pocket health care expenses than higher income people, but also spent more in actual per
capita dollars. Id. This ironic situation may have altered somewhat in the past several years
as private insurance programs have markedly raised their co-payment requirements. Crozier,
Data Watch: National Medical Care Spending, 3 HEALTH AtF., Fall 1984, at 108.
121. Walensky & Berk, Data Watch: Health Care, the Poor, and the Role of Medicaid, 1
HEALTH AFF., Fall 1982, at 93-106.
122. See J. HADLEY, MORE MEDCIAL CARE, BETTER HEALTH? (1982).
It would be a mistake to equate the levels of hospital and physician services used by
insured, white middle-class patients with the optimum level. The fact that insured whites
under age 65, in fair to poor health, averaged 7.2 physician visits per year does not prove that
uninsured whites in similar health (who saw physicians only 4.5 times per year) or uninsured
nonwhites (who averaged only 2.6 visits per year), were necessarily receiving too little medi-
cal attention. 1 SECURING AccEss TO HEALTH CARE, supra note 108, at 66-70. However,
other facts substantiate the adverse effects of lack of access to health care. Indigent patients
who lost Medicaid coverage because of changes in eligibility rules experienced clinically sig-
nificant worsening health status. For example, one 1983 study of such patients in California
found that six months after termination of benefits, patients with hypertension had exper-
ienced a 10 mm Hg rise in diastolic blood pressure (which increased their relative risk of
dying by 40%). Lurie, Ward, Shapiro & Brook, Termination from Med-Cal: Does it Affect
Health?, 311 NEw ENG. J. MED. 480, 484 (1984). The study associated this result with the
unavailability of care for this indigent population.
Fewer medically indigent adults could identify a usual source of care (50 percent
after termination vs. 96 percent before termination), fewer thought that they could
1986]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
2. Ethical Implications of Lack of Access
Currently Americans' health care access disparities take many
forms: "variations in the level of financial protection against health
care costs, in the financial impact of health care expenses, in the use
of services, in the availability of health resources, and in the use of
different settings offering varying levels of quality of care."' 123
Inadequate health care and the imposition of excessive burdens
to obtain health care are included as problems resulting from a lack
of insurance and resources. The issue becomes: to what extent are
these ethical problems? This issue has been addressed by recogniz-
ing that in American society many goods and services are distrib-
uted unevenly without concern that an injustice is being done.124
Yet health care is regarded differently, and its distribution is gov-
erned by principles of fairness that dictate equitable access to an
adequate level of care.'25 The reasons that health care is particu-
larly subject to the dictates of justice can be briefly summarized.
First, philosophers termed good health a "primary good," since
one need not know another's peculiar preferences and goals to know
that the person will value health, which is necessary for fulfilling
those preferences and goals.' 26 Although all people do not place
equal value on health (or even on life), the connection between
health care and the opportunity to enjoy life and pursue one's other
objectives is self-evident. Moreover, the need for health care varies
widely among individuals, and cannot be anticipated like other "ne-
cessities" of life.127
Of course, a large proportion of health services are not necessary
to save life or even to relieve suffering and restore functioning. Phy-
sicians and other health care personnel often deal with the "worried
well" and with patients whose medical problems are naturally self-
limiting. Even when this is so, the information-giving facet of
health care endows it with special ethical significance. Health care
in these circumstances can relieve patients' worries and allow them
to anticipate and adjust to the future course of their condition.
Moreover, reliable information supplied by a physician or other
health care professional can help a patient avoid a fruitless (and
obtain care when needed (38 percent vs. 83 percent), and fewer were satisfied with
their care (60 percent vs. 91 percent).
123. 1 SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE, supra note at 108.
124. Id. at 12.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 16.
127. Id. at 23.
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possibly painful and expensive) search for further diagnostic or
therapeutic procedures. Finally, health care has symbolic signifi-
cance: a person receiving it will feel cared for, a person deprived of
it-in a society where it is generally available under like circum-
stances-will probably feel excluded from the human community.
Thus, "health care has a special interpersonal significance: it ex-
presses and nurtures bonds of empathy and compassion." 
128
Three criteria have been suggested to judge the fairness of health
care distribution: equality, benefit, and equity. 129 The application
of an equality standard to health care could have very odd results.
It could mean that each person would be entitled to an equal
amount of care over the course of a year or perhaps over the per-
son's lifetime. Yet the need for care varies widely. If the guaran-
teed amount of care were set high enough to provide adequate care
for those with chronically poor health status, an enormous drain
would be imposed on resources that could be used to meet other
non-health care needs. Conversely, if the level was calibrated to
meet the needs of people in average or better health, services that
could preserve life or restore health would be unavailable for some
sick people.13
0
Alternatively, a fair distribution of health care could be inter-
preted to mean that everyone should have access to health care that
will be beneficial to them. Yet, since there is virtually no end to the
funds that could be used to achieve some possible medical benefit,
using benefit as the basis of an ethical theory of health care distribu-
tion would open the door to unlimited spending on this one good, to
the potential exclusion of many other individual and social goods.
Health care is of special importance, but not sole importance. A
just health care system can weigh the benefits of care against the
costs of achieving those benefits in comparison with the other goods
and services on which the resources might be spent. 3
The President's Commission concluded that the correct stan-
dard for judging the fairness of health care distribution is one that
ensures everyone equitable access to care, defined as access to "an
adequate level of health care."' 132 The commission concluded that
equitable access to care requires that people not face "excessive bur-
dens" in obtaining care-such as out-of-pocket expenses, travel and
128. Id. at 17.
129. Id. at 18-20.
130. Id. at 18.
131. Id. at 19.
132. Id. at 20.
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waiting times, and the like. 133 Adequate care is "enough care to
achieve sufficient welfare, opportunity, information, and evidence of
interpersonal concern to facilitate a reasonably full and satisfying
life." 1 34 Rather than being open-ended, the obligation created by
the adequate care standard recognizes that society's resources are
limited and have to be available for uses other than health care.
This view of equity in health care has major implications.
Above all, it treats health care as a complex system in which physi-
cians, institutions, and patients participate with others, such as em-
ployers, insurance companies, and governments, each having rights
and obligations vis-a-vis the others. For example, if the federal gov-
ernment changed the methods used to reimburse physicians, the
change cannot be judged solely by its effect on physicians or the
federal treasury. Rather, it must be scrutinized for the effect on
how well the system is fulfilling society's obligation to ensure that
each person has access to an adequate level of health care.1 35
3. Weighing Access Against Other Ethical Goals
Ethical theories are intended to provide means for examining
and resolving value conflicts. Value conflicts are not simply con-
flicts of good (better health) versus evil (decreased access to needed
health care). Instead, they are often conflicts of one good (increased
access to health services) versus another (better schools, safer neigh-
borhoods, more knowledge through research). Although many
physicians believe that value conflicts should never be resolved at
the patient's bedside, it is now generally acknowledged that they
must be addressed at the "macro" level. Resolution of value con-
flicts at the macro level involves a move beyond health care ethics
to encompass general social ethics in the distribution of resources in
society.
Because of the good-vs-good nature of some of the choices being
133. Id. at 21-22.
134. Id. at 20.
135. It is important to remember that an ethical, not legal, obligation is at issue here. To
find that a society has an ethical obligation to do something is to conclude that its failure to
do so is wrong and opens it to serious criticism. It does not mean that the persons who would
be benefited by society's actions have a corresponding right to demand society's aid. The
courts have not held health care to be a constitutionally guaranteed right. Thus, any discus-
sion of "rights" in this context should be limited to the protection of those claims that indi-
viduals may have within the context of existing legislation. For example, under existing law,
a Medicare beneficiary is entitled to have a certain payment made on his or her behalf. How-
ever, this does not answer the question of what society is obligated to provide through legisla-
tion or otherwise.
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made about health policy, macro-ethical analysis must focus on
more than the impact of changes in reimbursement methods on ac-
cess. Ethical analysis must also take into account other effects of
the changes in reimbursement, especially Medicare spending reduc-
tions which would not have occurred but for the policy changes. If
such reductions preserve other important features of the program
that might otherwise be dismantled or make available funds for
other important uses, the allocative decisions have to be judged on
their own merits. However, consistent ethical analysis will require
that decisions which limit the amount of beneficial care received be
disapproved if the payment system could have saved a like amount
by expending its funds more efficiently. In other words, decisions
must consider current knowledge about cost-effective medical care.
This concern is ethical as well as technical. Changes in the
health care system (such as in Medicare reimbursement policies) are
ethically desirable to the extent that they increase health care access
but undesirable to the extent that they do not. In this connection,
two points need to be assessed. First, it must be determined not
only if the program will save money, but also whether the program
will increase, or at least not decrease, access to health care. Second,
means must be established for measuring the effects of the program
to ascertain whether the situation is actually improved. For exam-
ple, if a change in reimbursement effect makes Medicare partici-
pants so unattractive as patients that some of them lose the ability
to obtain adequate care, this would plainly count heavily against
such changes on fairness grounds. Conversely, if a change in Medi-
care reimbursement methods either frees up monies to treat other
patients in public programs who lacked access to care, or otherwise
encourages or induces physicians to care for more such patients, it
would be evaluated as an ethically beneficial program.
By definition, scarce resources always imply rationing, and
economists insist that those people who resist explicit rationing of
health care seem not to realize that rationing already occurs. 136
Unlike age-related standards of the type found in Great Britain, we
ration according to ability to pay. 137 There are important differ-
ences between this less formal means of allocating resources and
explicit decisions denying a group of people necessary health serv-
ices (which is connoted by the stronger term "rationing"). A pro-
cess that merely allocates resources while not categorically denying
136. See, eg., Fuchs, The "Rationing" of Medical Care, 311 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1572
(1984).
137. See H. AARON & W. SCHWARTZ, THE PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION 7-8 (1984).
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needed care permits society to maintain other important values,
such as the sanctity of life and the equal worth of all persons.' 38
Although this may exalt image over reality, it may provide social
and ethical benefits sufficient to recommend it. For this approach
to succeed, however, resource allocation must be perceived as pro-
cedurally fair. Otherwise, society may fear that the informality or
invisibility of the decisionmaking process provides a cloak for bi-
ased choices by the decisionmakers.
IV. AsSESSING THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS
Precise effects of the ethical implications of the changes de-
scribed in the first two sections of this Article are not susceptible to
prediction. 39 In the absence of reliable quantitative predictions, it
is especially appropriate for health care reimbursement policymak-
ers to address possible ethical differences among policies. Even
when medical and economic effects can be estimated reliably, ethi-
cal implications are important in their own right.
Although the ethical implications are important for policymak-
ers in both public and private programs, special attention is ac-
corded here to the Medicare program. This is because the limited
financial ability of many members of the population involved in
Medicare gives them much less freedom than participants in private
health care insurance plans. This section now evaluates the conse-
quences of several types of changes in reimbursement in terms of
the three major ethical interests-fidelity, fairness, and access.
A. Effects on Fidelity to Patients' Interests
1. From Limiting Physicians' Rewards
There was a time, well within the memory of many physicians
still practicing today, when physicians were expected to-and did-
provide free medical care to patients with limited financial means.
Such care was provided both in physicians' offices and at charitable,
public and teaching hospitals. With this in mind, it might seem that
limiting the amount paid to a physician for services to a Medicare
patient would not adversely affect the physician-patient relationship
because at least some payment would still be involved. However,
physicians' practices and attitudes have changed. The remarkable
growth in third-party coverage of health care costs in the past quar-
ter-century has raised the complexity and expense of medical prac-
138. See G. CALABRESI & P. BOBrTT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978).
139. See supra notes 4-92 and accompanying text.
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tices, as well as practitioners' expectations of earnings. As a result,
patients with "substandard" third-party reimbursement rates have
difficulty commanding the attention, much less the loyalty, of many
physicians.
Although this phenomenon has been condemned by many, in-
cluding physicians," it is a reality which a payment system must
address. It has implications for all three of the ethical values dis-
cussed: fidelity (when patients are not treated), fairness to physi-
cians (when some treat a disproportionate share of a certain group
of patients), and in particular, patients' access to care. Thus, the
more effectively a program (such as a fee schedule) contains charges
for physicians' services to patients, the less likely it becomes that
those patients will have their interests vigorously pursued. 4
In some ways, it seems ironic that limitations in the level of pay-
ment could be thought to cut against physicians' fidelity to patients'
interests. This is particularly true of those limitations that remove
financial incentives for unlimited tests and procedures, such as capi-
tation programs or expenditure caps in fee-for-service situations.
Interestingly, the risk that physicians will overtreat their patients to
serve their own economic interests was a traditional ethical consid-
eration even before the advent of third-party payment. t42
140. Elias, Physicians Who Limit Their Office Practice to Insured and Paying Patients,
314 NEv ENG. J. MED. 391 (1986) (letter to editor):
Physicians who limit their office practice to insured and paying patients declare
themselves openly to be merchants rather than professionals. This mercantile ap-
proach has several consequences. First, it demeans the individual physician and
cheapens the profession. Second, it puts the third-party payer, as service purchaser,
in a position of greater importance than the patient. Third, it fosters the myth that
physicians as a group are greedy and self-serving rather than dedicated and altruis-
tic. And most important, it deprives a large segment of our fellow humans of care.
Physicians who value their professionalism should treat office patients on the basis
of need, not remuneration. Physicians who do not do so deserve the contempt and
censure of their colleagues.
141. Obviously, there are mitigating factors. A program whose terms are set by the mar-
ketplace (such as a PPO plan) may not have such adverse effects, provided that it just "clears
the market." In other words, the prices set permit physicians a fair return on both capital
and labor, leaving the supply of physicians willing to provide acceptable, dedicated medical
care sufficient to meet the demand for their services. Further, some programs, such as
HMOs, offer administrative or other advantages to compensate for their lower reimburse-
ment rates. Even when a program does not provide such off-setting benefits, patients with
long-standing relations with a particular physician or group will probably continue to receive
appropriate attention. This suggests that, from an ethical viewpoint, patients who believe
they have such relationships should have access to a program that permits them to retain it.
142. Health insurance is often considered the cause of overtreatment. It not only insu-
lates patients from many of the financial consequences of their medical care choices, thus
distorting their attitude about the relative benefit of medical interventions, but also encour-
ages physicians to do more, not less, since their patients' economic interest will not be
harmed. This leads to "unnecessary treatment .... [and] uncritical use of costly adjuncts
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Because of this potential conflict of interest, medical ethics cau-
tioned physicians to put their patients' interests first and to restrain
their impulses to intervene. Although this did not eliminate the
conflict, at least it acknowledged the problem and elevated the ethi-
cal expectations of the profession. With the continuing growth of
health facilities owned by investing physicians, the conflicts become
more acute. Ethical norms need to be reiterated and strengthened if
patient interests are to be protected. 143
2. From Exposing Physicians to Financial Risks
Reversing the financial incentives, to make it disadvantageous
for physicians to treat patients more intensively, poses the conflict-
of-interest issue in a somewhat unfamiliar way. This unfamiliar-
ity--on the part of physicians as well as patients-is itself part of
the problem. Until recently, the relatively small proportion of pa-
tients and physicians in arrangements such as HMOs had selected
this "reverse-incentive" situation themselves, against the back-
ground of a predominantly fee-for-service system. The ethos these
programs developed established mutual expectations and provided
the necessary insultation of physicians from undue conflicts of inter-
ests with their patients. If anything, physicians in such settings had
difficulty demonstrating that their decisions about patient care were
never influenced by the financial risk posed to their organization if
they were "too successful" in maintaining a patient.
This points to the fundamental difference in evaluating the eth-
ics of the current proposals. In the past, the weight of the societal
expectations reinforced the physician's presumption in favor of of-
fering (and sometimes imposing) anything believed to be of value to
the patient. Contrarily, the reimbursement plans that place physi-
cians and medical institutions at financial risk are intended to ally
physicians with society's new position that many medical interven-
tions are not cost-beneficial and ought to be avoided. At the very
least, the cost-containment efforts presume that it is possible to re-
duce health care expenditures without harming patients. Some
would say that it is now or soon will be routinely necessary to with-
hold (or decline to pay for) certain interventions that might benefit
such as hospitalization in lieu of (often preferable) ambulatory care, and an intricate battery
of excess laboratory studies." C. CHAPMAN, supra note 101, at 146. Moreover, even before
third-party payments existed, the physician's financial motivation to perform more services
rather than less placed his or her interests in conflict with patients' interests.
143. See Relman, Cost Control, Doctor's Ethics, and Patient Care, 1 ISSuES IN ScI. &
TECH., Winter 1985, at 103.
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patients but that simply cost too much for society to justify. In
either case, the collective attitude would no longer be a check on
physicians' temptation to place their own interests ahead of their
patients' interests. Instead, society would attempt to use physi-
cians' selfish motivation to restrain full pursuit of patients' interests.
Of course, the reality of the system is not as simple as this scena-
rio might suggest: physicians' norms are deeply ingrained. Society
does not speak with one voice, and the voice of insurance officials is
unlikely to actually proclaim the goal of slighting patients' interests.
Finally, it is a close question whether patients would not be better
served by less aggressive treatment, fewer tests and procedures.
Nonetheless, the interaction of society, physician, and patient
inherent in the risk-shifting reimbursement schemes represents a
subtle but definite shift of alliances. The outcome of this change
cannot be fully predicted. However, it seems clear that all con-
straints on resources will eventually alter the perceptions and expec-
tations of all the participants about what is "owed" to whom, what
treatments are "appropriate" in what circumstances, and even what
qualifies as a "disease" for which medical attention is indicated.'"
The effects of the various risk-shifting proposals on the ethical
value of fidelity can be differentiated as follows. First, proposals
such as MDDRGs and capitation that involve the greatest risk (and
hence generate greater pressure on the value of fidelity), would be
more problematic for conditions with a wide variation in treatment
and outcome (such as many chronic mental illnesses) than for con-
ditions with a smaller range of outcomes. A second division in-
volves the directness of the physician's financial exposure.
Programs that place the risk on the organization employing the
physician are less likely to interfere with a physician's pursuit of
144. In effect, this would be an extension of a phenomenon observed some time ago by
Friedson:
As the state assumes more responsibility for the welfare of the layman, professionals
become members of the class of caretakers, and the possibilities increase for differ-
ences between their perspective and that of laymen. Given the official status of the
profession, what happens to the layman- that is, whether or not he will be recog-
nized as "really" sick, what the sickness will be called, what treatment will be given
him, how he will be required to act while ill, and what will happen to him after
treatment- becomes a function of professional rather than lay decision.... Fur-
thermore, on an everyday basis [physicians] . . . serve as gatekeepers to special
resources (the most obvious of which are hospital beds and "ethical" drugs) that
cannot be used without their permission. Thus, the behavior of the physician and
others in the field of health constitutes the objectification, the empirical embodi-
ment, of certain dominant values in a society.
E. FRIEDSON, supra note 24, at 304.
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patients' interests than those programs that provide fixed payment
directly to physicians and thus increase their financial risk.
Finally, incentives and disincentives will probably prove more
ethically problematic than explicit restrictions imposed on physi-
cians' judgment by an institution or third-party payor for two rea-
sons. First, incentives and disincentives that operate through the
market's "invisible hand" are hard to police and, indeed, harder for
patients even to know about.145 Second, incentives (and perhaps
even disincentives) would appeal to physicians to be complicit in
achieving the institution's revenue-enhancing goals. Explicit re-
strictions, on the other hand, would be likely to generate resentment
among medical professionals and therefore would be resisted (on
the patient's behalf, one hopes). For example, suppose a plan dis-
courages providing certain expensive treatments to certain patients.
If the plan imposes financial risks on physicians or others with
whom they share economic interests, the physician may feel con-
strained not to inform patients of the treatment alternatives, render-
ing them unavailable within the plan. To withhold such
information would violate the physician's fidelity to the patient. Of
course, it is up to the physician to judge the propriety of care, with-
out obligation to mention minimally effective treatments or those
only used in limited research trials for which the patient is not eligi-
ble. But the propriety of treatment should be independent of the
financial aspects of care, which are for the patient to decide. It is
important that patients know about limitations built into the system
so that they can employ legitimate processes, both within an indi-
vidual treatment setting and through broader political processes, to
change them. 146
B. Effects on Fairness Among Physicians
The effects of limiting physicians' financial rewards on inter-
physician fairness will naturally depend on the nature of the limita-
tions. Attempts to create greater fee system rationality or to in-
crease competition among physicians to provide services are likely
145. See A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 456 (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds.
1976).
146. Whether the existing common law of informed consent would compel such disclo-
sure is open to debate. Disclosure is requried in those jurisdictions following the better, but
still minority, patient-oriented standard of materiality. Traditional jurisdictions only require
disclosure of those items that physicians customarily disclose. In these jurisdictions, physi-
cians might decide not to disclose options to patients who are not eligible for such options
under their insurance plan. See Blumstein, Rationing Medical Resources: A Constitutional
Legal and Policy Analysis, 59 TEx. L. REV. 1345, 1392-95 (1981).
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to reduce the present fee-for-service inequities, which greatly
overcompensates physicians for certain services. Changes that
place physicians on fixed salaries are more fair to the extent that
they reflect open market demand for physicians' services. Systems
which artificially constrain access to medical staff privileges or force
prepaid practice on unwilling practitioners in a particular field will
be likely to create inequities among physicians. Even when markets
operate freely, the value of physicians' services in various speciality
fields may not reflect the value of those services in an ideal world
because the lead time required for special training produces an im-
perfect market.
In systems in which illness-based or capitated payments go di-
rectly to physicians, physicians providing services for illnesses with
wider ranges of severity and durational variation and physicians
treating patients with higher complication rates are likely to suffer
financially. Hence, increased financial exposure of physicians as in-
dividuals is likely to increase unfairness.
C. Effects on Patients' Access to Care
1. From Limiting Physicians' Rewards
Although all of the proposed changes in payment methods are
intended to limit physicians' financial rewards, some proposals are
more likely to achieve that effect than others. Several facts about
price reductions (especially when linked with cutbacks in adminis-
trative budgets, which delay the processing of claims) should be rec-
ognized. First, price reductions are more likely to affect access to
care negatively if they affect only one population segment. If differ-
ent programs produce markedly different financial rewards for phy-
sicians, the specter of two-tier (or multi-tier) care is inevitable.147
This is particularly true when the population in the effected plans is
distinguishable from the general patient population. When a distin-
guishable population has limited financial resources, or when its
members have some resources but assignment rules preclude col-
lecting additional charges directly from them, that sector will be
unable to "buy up" in the system.
Second, annual program changes (such as have occurred in
Medicare in recent years as part of Congressional budget-balancing
efforts) are particularly disruptive and thus likely to drive physi-
cians out of the system. Finally, until reimbursement changes have
147. See, eg., Rosenblatt, Dual Track Health Care-The Decline of the Medicaid Cure,
44 U. CIN. L. REv. 643, 644-45 (1975).
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percolated through the system, which will require time for physi-
cian and patient behavioral adjustments, alternative sources of care
cannot be expected to fill in the gaps in access created by the with-
drawal of physicians who do not believe that a particular program,
such as Medicare, rewards them sufficiently for their efforts. 4 '
It may seem as though all cost-controlling changes in reimburse-
ment methods would, at least initiatlly, negatively affect access.' 49
Programs having the least negative effect, or the most positive ef-
fect, are those with greater administrative simplicity (such as
HMOs), special benefits to participating physicians (such as the ac-
cess to a pool of enrolled patients provided under a PPO agree-
ment), and the smallest reductions in physicians' income and
freedom to practice (such as refinements in current fee-for-service
payment methods).15 0
2. From Exposing Physicians to Financial Risks
Some of the most disturbing effects on patients' access to care
could result from reimbursement methods that shift some or all of
the financial risks of treating patients from the insurance fund to
physicians and/or institutions with which they are associated. Phy-
sicians might overcome price-lowering efforts by increasing the
number of service units,'' but, physicians (and health care institu-
tions) can "beat" risk-shifting efforts only by attempting to exclude
high-risk patients from the pool of patients they will treat. Capita-
tion programs, packaging of services, and prepaid arrangements
such as HMOs have a built-in disincentive to accept the sickest and
poorest patients, the very ones who have the hardest time obtaining
health care.
148. The real difficulty for Medicare patients is the fact that, although they are an impor-
tant segment of the market, they are not the whole market. Thus, reimbursement rule
changes that make such patients less financially attractive-especially changes which empha-
size the competitive aspects of health care provision-will have an adverse effect on their
ability to obtain care because the best medical resources will be drawn to other market seg-
ments where they will be more generously rewarded.
149. Hypothetically, under fee-for-service methods, the adverse effects on physicians' net
income exerted by lowered fees could result in increased access to care as physicians with
"excess capacity" (i.e., time in their schedules) raised the number of interventions they initi-
ated. This effect would result, however, only to the extent that physicians sought new pa-
tients, rather than simply doing more things to the same patients.
150. Stricter assignment requirements for physicians who wish to receive direct Medicare
reimbursement for any patients, though perhaps a negative factor in the short run, are likely
to have positive long-term impact on access. Such a requirement actually simplifies physi-
cians' activities and removes an impediment (actual or perceived) to some patients' seeking
health care.
151. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
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It is important to recognize that greater rationing of services is
not merely an unfortunate side effect of these programs-it is their
very intent- particularly the programs that place some of the finan-
cial risks on the shoulders of physicians or the institutions in which
they have employment or other interests. Historically, the financial
incentives provided by Medicare and other third-party payment sys-
tems have simply reinforced physicians' professional norm of "do
everything possible" for every patient. By shifting the incentives
and creating the disincentive that results from having one's own fi-
nances at risk, the new methods of physician reimbursement turn
physicians into gatekeepers for the health care system. Their deci-
sions would no longer be based on medical criteria alone (i.e., "does
medicine have something to offer this patient?") but would now
have to take into account their own financial risk if they admit pa-
tients into the system whose care costs more than insurance will
pay.
D. What Directions to Go-and How?
The problems involved with the various means of paying physi-
cians are not absolute objections to any of the options. Rather, they
are factors which should be considered in responding to the need to
contain health care costs. With this in mind, it is relevant to con-
sider the most desirable courses, the role of legal institutions and
other means of review and control in avoiding or minimizing the
potential ethical problems.
Among the suggested payment methods, capitation presents the
greatest incentive for appropriate use of resources. It discourages
both over-treatment (which unnecessarily expends resources) and
under-treatment (which risks worsening enrollees' health and hence
creating later expenses that could have been avoided). Conse-
quently, capitated payments, by creating a strong incentive for phy-
sicians to take an interest in their patients' health, serve the value of
fidelity well.152 However, capitation exposes health care providers
to great financial risks. Hence, capitated plans that permit a pro-
vider to spread the risks over a large patient base, which insulates
clinical decisionmaking from anxiety over such risks, are preferable.
152. Capitated programs do, however, raise cost-containment problems if they do not
include some aspect of cost-sharing (co-payments, etc.) by enrolled patients who otherwise
have no financial incentive to constrain their consumption of medical resources. See, eg.,
Brown, Competition and Health Cost Containment: Cautions and Conjectures, 59 MILBANK
MEMORIAL FUND Q. 145 (1981).
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These features are best attained when care is provided by a clinic or
group practice.
Unlike individual physician-patient contracts, group settings
can also operate as markets for physicians' services; hence they are
conducive to achieving fairness among physicians, provided that
certain physicians or groups do not remove themselves from the
arena by refusing to treat patients whose care is paid for by a plan
such as Medicare.
The success of any plan in ensuring equitable access to care is
largely dependent upon the funds the plan makes available to physi-
cians to treat the plan's beneficiaries. 153 In this respect, capitation
plans may be more attractive than other programs, such as fee-for-
service or fee schedules, that pay equal amounts because capitated
programs require less bureaucratic interaction between the provider
and the third-party payor. Although a group practice or clinic may
have to recreate some of the same oversight mechanisms, such in-
ternal mechanisms, may seem less burdensome to physicians than
the third-party payor's 54
It is likely that various means will be adopted by public and
private plans to contain the costs of medical care. The capitation
method advantages are far from overwhelming and decrease when
the unit of care is an individual physician. Regardless of any disa-
greement over the relative merits of one approach or another, the
pressures to modify the prevailing mode of third-party payment to
physicians is irresistible. Change may lead to increased use of ex-
plicit "rationing" techniques, an activity in which American society
is reluctant to engage. 55 Society's disinclination towards rationing
may lead to the adoption of measures that rely on physician deci-
sionmaking, which tend to be less visible and provoke less conflict
with collective norms about the equal and incalculable worth of
every human life.156
153. One commentator has noted that providers' disinclination to serve certain popula-
tions, such as the sickest patients, might be overcome if a higher premium is charged for
those enrollees. The actuarial feasibility of designing risk-adjusted premiums and vouchers is
quite another problem. Making the premium a smooth function of several factors such as
age, sex, family medical history, and the like might avoid many of the problems associated
with the yes/no decisions on disability eligibility. Luft, Health Maintenance Organizations
and the Rationing of Medical Care, 60 MILBANK MEMORIAN FUND Q. 268, 299 (1982).
154. Internal mechanisms include controlling unnecessary spending and monitoring for
quality. These may seem less burdensome due to their local and less bureaucratic nature.
155. Some commentators have suggested that rationing of health services is not merely
inevitable, but desirable. See, e.g., H. AARON & W. SCHWARTZ, supra note 137, at 60. See
also Schwartz, We Need to Ration Medicine, Newsweek, Feb. 8, 1982, at 13.
156. See Schwartz, We Need to Ration Medicine, supra note 155, at 13.
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This is not to say that society will or ought to rely solely on
physician decisionmaking. Informed consent from patients, mal-
practice law, and various forms of professional review are several
means to oversee physician decisionmaking.
L Informed Consent
Patients must be well informed about treatment options if they
are to serve as an effective check on inappropriate physician deci-
sions. Interestingly, a payment program (such as capitation or MD-
DRGs) that places decisions on the physician regarding the range of
interventions to offer a patient is more likely to lead to a full disclo-
sure requirement than is a program that relies on fee schedules
which limit the services that will be reimbursed. This is so because
there is some question whether the physician has a duty to disclose
options that are not available to the patient.157
2. Malpractice
Malpractice law provides a broadly applicable means of regulat-
ing physician behavior to prevent harm arising from their response
to payment methods that seek to contain medical costs. Malprac-
tice law has not, however, proven to be a uniformly effective mecha-
nism for preventing either undertreatment of patients in programs
that constrain costs'5 8 or excessive interventions with patients
under private fee-for-service plans. Most physicians subscribe to
the view that malpractice rules force them to use tests and treat-
ments that are not required by their best clinical judgment. This is
not only unsupported by the evidence, 159 but is so closely aligned
157. See supra note 146.
158. Not only is it difficult to bring refusals of care within malpractice jurisdiction, but
the premature discharge of poor patients from hospitals and the substandard conditions in
many hospitals where they are treated have also been remarkably unaffected by malpractice
litigation. It may be that these patients, less aware of how to pursue their legal rights, do not
expect better treatment. Even if they do seek redress they are less likely to bring a successful
lawsuit because the usual measure of damages, lost wages and added medical expenses, are
largely irrelevant for people with little or no regular earnings whose medical care is paid for
by public programs. See Rosenblatt, Rationing "Normal" Health Care: The Hidden Legal
Issues, 59 TEx. L. REV. 1401, 1411-16 (1981). This is confirmed by 1970 data presented by
the HEW Secretary's commission on malpractice, which reveals that only 1.2% of malprac-
tice claimants are Medicaid beneficiaries, despite their much higher percentage in the patient
population. See Rudov, Myers & Mirabella, Medical Malpractice Insurance Claims Files
Closed in 1970, in SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE'S MALPRACTICE
COMMISSION, REPORT ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE app. at 1, 11 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as HEW REPORT ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE].
159. See, eg., Bernzweig, Defensive Medicine, in HEW REPORT ON MEDICAL MALPRAC-
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with physicians' self-interest under fee-for-service payment that it is
suspect.
The question remains whether malpractice law will be an effec-
tive policing mechanism if the incentives in medical care are re-
versed. It seems unlikely that malpractice law by itself would
generate much, if any, pressure toward cost-saving behavior. 160 On
the contrary, a physician who orders fewer tests, has less equipment
available, and relies on less highly credentialed personnel "run[s]
the risk of increased exposure to malpractice liability.""16 This oc-
curs simply because a large part of any physician's exposure to lia-
bility depends on patients' inclination to sue, and cost-containing
steps may well strike patients as blameworthy should any unex-
pected results occur. But malpractice law does not itself create lia-
bility, provided that the steps taken by the physician were medically
sound. The premise of cost containment, after all, is that much of
what is now done could be foregone without harming patients. A
physician whose judgment is consistent with this premise is not
guilty of malpractice. Ironically, the very flexibility of professional
judgment across a wide spectrum of accepted practice creates
doubts about the efficacy of malpractice law as a check on ethical
abuses under new payment mechanisms. 62 Were the medical pro-
fessional to agree upon standards of appropriate care for more con-
ditions, the malpractice system-in which standards are set by the
medical profession, not the law 163-would be more effective to pun-
ish inadequate care and ensure that adequate care is not forced to
become excessive to avoid liability."
3. Peer Review
Since the malpractice system is expensive, slow, and neglects
TICE, supra note 158, app. at 38, 40; Project, The Medical Malpractice Threat: A Study of
Defensive Medicine, 1971 DUKE L.J. 939, 941-43, 953-67.
160. See Schuck, Malpractice Liability and the Rationing of Care, 59 TEX. L.J. 1421,
1422 (1981).
161. Blumstein, supra note 146, at 1395.
162. See generally Rosenblatt, supra note 158, at 1416-19.
163. Toth v. Community Hosp., 22 N.Y.2d 255, 262, 292 N.Y.S.2d 440, 447, 239 N.E.2d
368, 372 (1968) ("The law generally permits the medical profession to establish its own stan-
dards of care.").
164. The data for such standard setting is woefully inadequate, especially for procedures
outside the hospital. Wennberg, Which Rate is Right?, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 310, 311
(1986) ("Decision analyis and consensus approaches may work well to distinguish the clearly
inappropriate from the clearly appropriate, but when key facts are unavailable, such tech-
niques can be expected only to point out (not to resolve) the many differences that exist
among physicians.").
[Vol. 36:708
PAYING PHYSICIANS
many cases, other review mechanisms are necessary. Some review
programs exist regardless of the payment mechanism: professional
and governmental bodies screen, license, and discipline physicians.
Except for the most eggregious incompetence their effectiveness is
uncertain. Moreover, these processes are usually grounded on a
norm of appropriate conduct articulated by the profession. Thus,
they would not restrain conduct that departs from earlier views of a
patient's best interests (e.g., how intensively to treat a dying cancer
patient who develops renal failure) if that conduct accords with new
norms of appropriate medical behavior. Such changes in medical
norms occur for many reasons: new scientific findings, evolving cul-
tural views about life, suffering and death, and changed social atti-
tudes toward the extent that care should be provided under certain
circumstances.
The rising costs of health care over the past twenty years have
led to the development of many forms of review. Some, such as
utilization review committees, are institution-based. 65 Others,
such as the Professional Standard Review Organizations (PSROs),
operate as part of the reimbursement system. Although good hospi-
tals have traditionally attempted to discover (and prevent repetition
of) bad results caused by inadequate care, the thrust of utilization
review bodies, like that of PSROs, is avoiding the unnecessary use
of resources, rather than protecting patient interests in fidelity or
access. 166
Review mechanisms which focus on patient welfare obviously
will be necessary for any payment scheme, particularly one that
tries to combine fairness to all physicians with society's goal of re-
ducing the amount of (unnecessary) care provided to patients. As
165. Brown, The Rationing of Hospital Care, in 3 SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE,
supra note 108, at 253, 280:
Hospital utilization review committees have had an impact beyond the specific cases
to which their negative or corrective judgments have been made. They have also
created an environment in many hospitals in which physicians, having received neg-
ative peer judgments in the past, try to anticipate such judgments by altering their
clinical practice. Utilization review has probably exerted a modest influence on
physicians' hospital practices through peer pressure, but it has avoided any funda-
mental changes in the structure of hospital or medical decisonmaking.
166. In Wickline v. California, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1175, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1986), the
Court of Appeals reversed a judgment against the state Medicaid program for harm that
occurred to a patient as a result of premature discharge from the hospital following denial by
the Medicaid program of the full extension of hospitilization requested by the attending phy-
sician. The court held that third-party payors may be held liable when inappropriate dis-
charge decisions result from defects in their cost-containment mechanisms but found that the
physician for Ms. Wickline had complied with the ruling without protesting its medical
inappropriateness.
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was true of malpractice, review procedures will ultimately require
more comprehensive scientific data for a better understanding of
what constitutes good quality medical care. This is especially true
regarding the connection between particular interventions and ben-
eficial outcomes:
Unless the medical profession accepts responsibility for the ques-
tion of "which rate is right" and addresses these issues with the
current cost-containment context, others will see to it that the
"least is always best" theory dominates by default. After all, if
physicians can't agree on what is best, why do more? 167
One method to evaluate the likely success of such efforts is to evalu-
ate experience with attempts to add these considerations to the re-
view process in the wake of the adoption of prospective payment for
hospitals in 1983.168 As HCFA in effect admitted at the time that
the prospective payment regulations were first published, 169 its
then-existing orientation and experience did not include methods
for systematically monitoring the ill-effects of incentives to under-
treat Medicare patients. Similarly, HCFA has only recently moved
to establish the necessary criteria for peer review of the quality of
HMO care, now that HMOs have been permitted since the begin-
ning of 1985 to enroll Medicare beneficiaries under risk contracts
with the federal government.' 70
V. CONCLUSION
The greatest significance of the various proposals for containing
physician payments lies not in the specifics of the alternatives but in
certain factors that are common to them all. First, the plans recog-
nize that medical expenditures must be contained, even at the cost
of forgoing some beneficial care. If the choices made in implement-
ing these changes are going to be broadly accepted, they must be
based on a legitimate process that utilizes recognized ethical
standards.
Second, to the extent that the plans all rely on economically
driven behaviors, they reinforce a general trend away from viewing
medicine as a special calling to viewing it as part of the marketplace
itself. Again, this fact serves to underscore the continuing impor-
167. Wennberg, supra note 164, at 311.
168. See K. LOHR, R. BROOK, G. GOLDBERG, M. CHASSIN & T. GLENNAN, IMPACT OF
MEDICARE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ON THE QUALITY OF MEDICAL CARE: A RESEARCH
AGENDA (1985).
169. 48 Fed. Reg. 39,160 (1983).
170. Wallace, June 28 Set as Deadline for Submitting Criteria for Peer Review of HMO
Quality, 15 MOD. HEALTH CARE, June 21, 1985, at 68.
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tance of ethical precepts in protecting as much of the old norms of
medicine as possible. Finally, the objectives of cost-containment
programs must themselves be evaluated from an ethical perspective.
If such efforts rest on an intention to reduce waste so that precious
resources can be made available to persons who now lack adequate
care, then the efforts themselves have ethical justification. If they
rest on the decision to exclude certain groups from the access to an
adequate level of care, provided by physicians and other profession-
als who maintain fidelity to the patients' interests, then the efforts
themselves are ethically unacceptable regardless of the mechanisms
instituted to oversee their operation.
